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A SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE QUAGMIRE: THE SUPREME
COURT REVIVES THE PRETEXT
DOCTRINE AND CREATES ANOTHER
FINE FOURTH AMENDMENT MESS
EDWIN J. BUTTERFOSSt

I.

INTRODUCTION

It has been said that one thing that unifies liberal and conservative commentators on the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court is "virtual unanimity, transcending normal ideological dispute,
that the Court simply has made a mess of search and seizure law."1
The Court's decisions in the area of suspicionless searches and
2
seizures amply support that proposition.
To believe the pronouncements of the United States Supreme
Court, "lawful suspicionless searches and seizures" should be almost
an oxymoron. Time and again the Court has declared as a basic tenet
of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence that "a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of
wrongdoing" 3 and on at least two occasions has stuck down a suspicionless search scheme because it did not "fit within the closely
guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
t Professor of Law, Hamline University School of Law; B.S., 1977, Miami University (Ohio); J.D., 1980, Georgetown University Law Center. The author would like to
thank Lisa Dailey and Jessica Stott for the research support they provided for this Article, and Dean Jon Garon for his support of the research for this Article through a grant
from the Faculty Research Fund of Hamline University School of Law.
1. Silas J. Wasserstrom & Louis M. Seidman, The Fourth Amendment as Constitutional Theory, 77 GEO. L.J. 19, 20 (1988). See also Scott E. Sundby, A Return to
Fourth Amendment Basics: Undoing the Mischief of Camara and Terry, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 383, 383 (1988) (stating "[i]n its Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, the United
States Supreme Court has struggled continually, and unsuccessfully, to develop a coherent analytical framework.").
2. Stephen J. Schulhofer, On The FourthAmendment Rights Of The Law-Abiding
Public, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. 87, 88-89 (1989) (referring to "doctrinal incoherence" in this
area).
3. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37 (2000) (citing Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308 (1997)). See also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 560 (1976). Historically, individualized suspicion in the form of probable cause was
a prerequisite for finding the government's fourth amendment activity reasonable and
therefore constitutional. Generally, a warrant based on the individualized suspicion
was also required. In circumstances in which a warrant was excused (due to exigent
circumstances), individualized suspicion was still required. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469
U.S. 325, 340, 342 n.8 (1985).

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

searches [and seizures] ."4 But the notion that only a single "category"
of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures exists and that the
category is "closely guarded" is a fantasy. 5
Although many discussions of suspicionless searches begin with
the Court's decision in New Jersey v. T.L. 0.6 and focus on the "special
needs" doctrine that finds its genesis in that case, the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence begins much earlier and extends far beyond government activity serving "special needs." The door to
suspicionless searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment
was opened in the landmark case of Camara v. Municipal Court of
San Francisco,7 when the Court for the first times authorized a search

without a showing of individualized suspicion. 9 Since opening the
door in Camara, the Court has upheld suspicionless searches in numerous contexts, creating several categories of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches.10
Although even after Camarathe general rule ostensibly remained
that a search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of
individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, the corollary that such suspicion is not an "irreducible" component of reasonableness" more often
carried the day. 1 2 For thirty years, the Court upheld virtually every
government scheme of suspicionless searches and seizures that came
4. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001); see also Chandler v.
Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
5. Even the Court routinely identifies several categories or classes of suspicionless searches. See infra note 265 and accompanying text.
6. 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
7. 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
8. As a theoretical matter, the principle was never absolute; it states the ordinary
rule, not the universal rule. See Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 561 (stating the "Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible requirement of such suspicion"). But as a practical
matter, until Camarain 1967, the Supreme Court had never upheld a search not justified by individualized suspicion of wrongdoing, although lower courts had apparently
assumed such searches were justified at the border and in other limited circumstances.
Sundby, 72 MINN. L. REV. at 386-89, 386 n.9.
9. In Camara, the Court declared lawful area inspections supported by warrants
based on reasonable administrative standards rather than individualized suspicion.
The Court redefined probable cause in the administrative inspection context to include
such standards, rather than individualized suspicion. See infra notes 63-65 and accompanying text. The particular inspections before the Court had not been authorized by a
warrant and therefore were found unconstitutional, but the Court held that inspections
authorized by a warrant supported by the "new," suspicionless probable cause would be
lawful. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 536-39 (1967).
10. See Scott E. Sundby, Protectingthe Citizen "Whilst He is Quiet: Suspicionless
Searches, "Special Needs" and General Warrants, 74 Miss. L.J. 501, 550 (2004) (stating
Camara's reasonableness balancing test spawned later "special needs" cases and
.opened the door to unintended mischief").
11. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 561.
12. See Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 518 (describing the cases as a "steady march of
victories" for the government); see also Robert D. Dodson, Ten Years Of Randomized
Jurisprudence:Amending the Special Needs Doctrine, 51 S.C. L. REV. 258, 288 (2000)
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before it, 1 3 belying the Court's description of the category as a "closely
guarded" exception to the general rule that individualized suspicion is
required to undertake a search or seizure.1 4 Despite the Court's
description of the category of permissible suspicionless searches and
seizures as "closely guarded," the Court has never defined a discrete
category 15 and has failed to identify precisely the characteristics that
qualify government searches for treatment outside the ordinary rule
requiring individualized suspicion. Instead, the Court at times has
spoken of "regulatory" or "administrative" searches, at other times has
invoked the "special needs" label, and on still other occasions has upheld suspicionless seizures at "checkpoints" and "inventory searches,"
apparently treating them as sui generis. Most recently, the Court upheld a suspicionless search scheme under its "general Fourth Amendment approach."1 6 For each new category-or "subcategory" if the
Court insists there is only one "closely guarded category"-the Court
created, it invoked different standards by which to assess the constitutionality of the search. Over the years, the "category" of suspicionless
searches became a jurisprudential mess, with the only consistent
theme being that suspicionless search schemes were regularly upheld
as lawful.
A particularly confusing aspect of the Court's suspicionless search
and seizure analysis over the years has been the relevance of a "noncriminal" or "non-law enforcement" purpose motivating the search. In
several early suspicionless search and seizure cases, the presence of a
law enforcement purpose seemed unimportant in the Court's assessment of the permissibility of the government scheme. 17 In other
cases, the Court ruled that such a purpose was relevant only if it was
the "sole" purpose motivating the scheme.' 8 More recently, the Court
imposed a new "primary purpose" test to strike down government
schemes to conduct suspicionless searches or seizures.19 While this
new restriction on suspicionless searches and seizures should be a
(stating that for over ten years the Court has never invalidated a law using the "special
needs" balancing test).
13. See Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 511 (stating the Court upheld suspicionless
searches in a variety of settings at a "dizzying pace for the world of constitutional law").
14. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 309.
15. The Court itself at times refers to "classes of cases" and describes several categories or subcategories, often in the same cases in which it refers to the "closely guarded
category" of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at
37 (stating the Court has recognized "limited circumstances" in which usual rule requiring individualized suspicion does not apply); see also Chandler, 520 U.S. at 308-09 (referring to "limited circumstances" and "closely guarded category").
16. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2197, 2202 (2006).
17. See infra notes 84-110 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 119-131 and accompanying text.
19. See infra notes 43-53 and 261-328 and accompanying text.
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welcomed change from the apparently limitless 20 reach of these government schemes suggested by the Court's early decisions, celebrating
the new test as an effective limit on suspicionless searches and
seizures would be premature. Although the Court claimed to have imposed the test to "prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine
part of American life," 2 1 the new test is unlikely to reduce significantly the suspicionless searches to which citizens are subjected. Instead, the new test only adds to the jurisprudential "mess" in this
area, 2 2 creating nothing less than a suspicionless search quagmire.
An initial difficulty with the primary purpose test is ambiguity
about the precise purpose the Court finds improper. 2 3 In various
cases, the Court has expressed concern over, or suggested a different
24
outcome for, searches motivated by a "law enforcement purpose,"
2
5
"general crime control purposes,"
"a general interest in crime con26
trol," an "intent to aid law enforcement efforts," 2 7 a "purely investigatory purpose,"2 8 an "investigatory police motive,"2 9 a "purpose ...to
detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing," 30 "ordinary needs of
law enforcement," 3 1 the "normal need for law enforcement," 3 2 a "general interest in law enforcement," 33 a purpose to "discover evidence of
criminal wrongdoing,"3 4 a purpose "to obtain[ ] evidence of ...viola20. During this period of expansion, commentators almost uniformly criticized this
new category of searches and seizures as being without standards or limits. See
Sundby, 72 MINN. L. REV. at 385 (balancing test expanded without justification or limits); see also Dodson, 51 S.C. L. REV. at 261-62, 284, 288 (stating special needs never
adequately defined leading to broad expansion); see also Jennifer Y. Buffaloe, Note,
"SpecialNeeds" and the Fourth Amendment: An Exception Poised to Swallow the Warrant PreferenceRule, 32 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 529 (1997) (stating special needs exception so broad and far reaching it is poised to turn the warrant preference rule on its
head).
21. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
22.

See, JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 19.01, at nn.

12-14 (LexisNexis 3d ed. 2002) (stating recent Court opinions leave the law "muddier
than before").
23. See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 89 (discussing the Court's inability to
discriminate among the sorts of non-law-enforcement objectives as one cause of the
"doctrinal incoherence" in this area).
24. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 69, 74 (referring also to "law enforcement ends").
25. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
26. Id. at 39, 47 (also referring to "general purpose of investigating crime").
27. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 75.
28. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987)).
29. South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 376 (1976).
30. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
31. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 666 (1989).
32. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480
U.S. 709, 720 (1987) (plurality opinion); Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646,
653 (1995).
33. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79.
34. Vernonia, 515 U.S. at 653.
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tion[s] of the penal laws,"3 5 and searches "in any way related to the
36
conduct of criminal investigations."
Even if the Court were to unambiguously define the purpose it
considers improper, another weakness of the primary purpose test as
a limit on suspicionless search schemes by the government is that it
apparently applies only to certain "subcategories" of suspicionless
searches. If that is the case, the Court can avoid the new limitation by
upholding suspicionless search schemes utilizing a "subcategory" not
limited by the "primary purpose" test. 3 7 Even if the test is broadly
applied, because the test restricts only schemes where the primary
purpose is improper, it is open to manipulation by the government.
Unless the Court is willing to scrutinize carefully the government's
true motivation in "mixed motive" schemes, 38 governments will be
free to accomplish their improper objective by articulating a primary
purpose that passes muster. 3 9 If the Court is willing to engage in
close scrutiny of the government purpose, it will face the charge that it
has revived the pretext doctrine that it appeared to bury in Whren v.
United States.40 Although the Court continues to declare irrelevant
the subjective motivations of an individual officer acting with probable
cause, the new primary purpose test raises the issue of "institutional
pretext" 4 1 that, while perhaps different from the pretext deemed irrelevant in Whren, nevertheless requires the Court to embark on an exploration of the motivations of the government actors who devise and
implement the schemes in question, something the Court has resisted
42
doing in the past and has labeled unworkable.
By injecting a "primary purpose" test into the analysis of these
government schemes, the Court has injected significant uncertainty
into the area of suspicionless searches without clearly identifying its
35. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716 n.27 (1987); see also Ortega, 480 U.S. at
724 (plurality opinion) ('gather evidence of a criminal offense").
36. Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002).
37. This would include categories governed by the "sole purpose" test as well as
categories where government purpose does not disqualify the use of a suspicionless
search scheme. See United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001) (stating that
because the holding rests on "ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis," no basis exists for
examining official purpose; such examination limited to "some special needs and administrative search cases"); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 230, 244, 245

(4th ed. 2004) (explaining how the Court can avoid this limitation by creating a new
supporting theory).
38. See infra notes 124-30, 197-206 and 336-38 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 289-91 and 346-47 and accompanying text.
40. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). See Knights, 534 U.S. at 122 (explaining examination of
motivation of officers after Whren limited to "some special needs and administrative
search cases"); Edmond, 531 U.S. at 51-52 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting) (citing Whren to
argue the majority improperly examined the purpose of the traffic checkpoint).
41. See infra notes 283-92 and accompanying text.
42. See infra notes 338-45 and accompanying text.

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

goal in adopting the new test-it is not clear what "evil" the Court is
attempting to protect against. More fundamentally, if the Court is
successful in policing suspicionless searches and seizures with a criminal purpose, citizens will remain subject to "non-criminal" suspicionless search and seizure schemes. The Court's new test is based on
the flawed notion that searches for "non-criminal" purposes are somehow less intrusive, an assumption the Court historically has rejected
and which the present Court failed to satisfactorily explain or justify.
This Article contends the Court's use of a primary purpose test to
regulate suspicionless searches and seizures by the government is
misguided and will provide little or no protection against the evils that
apparently led the Court to strike down recent schemes by government officials. The evil of the government schemes is less the purpose
of the schemes than their expansion into areas and activities in which
citizens should be protected from government intrusion in the absence
of any suspicion of wrongdoing. Rather than facing this head on and
carefully assessing whether the government schemes infringe on such
areas or activities, the Court has taken the indirect route of applying
the primary purpose test, a test that is difficult to apply and will enjoy
no more success than it did when proposed as a limit on pretextual
activity by the government in other settings. The Court-and citizens
and law enforcement officials-would be better served by focusing on
the privacy interest infringed upon by the government activity and
whether the government scheme includes appropriate safeguards
against arbitrary actions by government officials rather than the "primary purpose" of the scheme.
II.

REVIVING THE PRETEXT DOCTRINE: THE PRIMARY
PURPOSE TEST OF CITY OF INDIANAPOLIS
V. EDMOND

In City of Indianapolisv.Edmond,43 the United States Supreme
Court for the first time declared unconstitutional a suspicionless
seizure scheme based on an improper primary purpose of the government in carrying out the scheme. 44 In Edmond, the Court declared
unconstitutional a program of vehicle checkpoints operated on Indianapolis roads in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs based on the law
enforcement purpose of the checkpoint. 4 5 Although the Court previ43. 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
44. A few years earlier, the Court struck down a suspicionless search scheme in
Chandler v.Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997). However in Chandler, the Court's concern
was not that the government purpose was improperly "crime control," but that, in fact,
the government had not proven a social problem of sufficient magnitude to justify the
suspicionless search scheme. Chandler, 520 U.S. at 322.
45. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000).
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ously had discussed government purpose in various cases in which
suspicionless searches and seizures were challenged, a "law enforcement purpose" had never been the basis for the Court to strike down
such a scheme. Of course, over the years, the Court had struck down
very few suspicionless search or seizure schemes on any basis. But
when the Court did so, it was not the law enforcement purpose that
doomed the scheme. Despite that fact, the accepted wisdom seemed to
be that a "non-law enforcement purpose" was important-if not a prerequisite-to a suspicionless search or seizure scheme qualifying
within "the closely guarded category of permissible suspicionless
searches [and seizures]."46 But that proposition would have been
hard to prove prior to Edmond. It was a misconception based on an
imprecise reading of Camara and a mischaracterization of one of the
main doctrines in the area-the so called "special needs" exception.
Nevertheless, in her opinion for the Court in Edmond, Justice
O'Connor focused immediately on the purpose of the checkpoint program. She described the checkpoint as having a "primary purpose of
interdicting drugs," and stated that the Court had "never approved a
checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of
ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 4 7 Justice O'Connor described the
checkpoints it previously had upheld as "designed primarily to serve
purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the
necessity of ensuring roadway safety," and held that "[blecause the
primary purpose of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is
to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program
48
contravenes the Fourth Amendment."
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissenting opinion highlights the confusion the Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence has
spawned. First, he accused the Court of imposing a new "non-lawenforcement primary purpose test" on traffic checkpoints operated by
the government. 4 9 Justice O'Connor vehemently denied the charge,
explaining that the Court's opinion did not turn on the purpose of the
checkpoints being "primarily related to criminal law enforcement," but
rather "on the fact that the primary purpose .. .is to advance the
46. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 (2001) (referring to Court of
Appeals reliance on "our line of cases recognizing that 'special needs' may, in certain
exceptional circumstances, justify a search policy designed to serve non-law-enforcement ends"); see also Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 79 n.15 (stating that "In other special needs
cases, we have tolerated suspension of the Fourth Amendment's warrant or probablecause requirement in part because there was no law enforcement purpose behind the
searches in those cases. . . ."). See infra notes 151-56 and accompanying text.
47. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41.
48. Id. at 41-42.
49. Id. at 53 (Rehnquist, C. J., dissenting).
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general interest in crime control." 50 It is fair to say Chief Justice
Rehnquist likely was not the only one confused by that distinction.
Chief Justice Rehnquist also criticized the Court for improperly reinjecting the subjective intention of government officials into the
Fourth Amendment analysis of traffic stops contrary to the Court's
pretext decision in Whren v. United States.5 1 He asserted that such a
test was "both unnecessary to secure Fourth Amendment rights and
bound to produce wide-ranging litigation over the 'purpose' of any
given seizure." 5 2 The majority denied improperly reinjecting purpose
into the analysis, drawing a distinction between Whren pretext issues
and an inquiry into the "programmatic purposes... of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion." 53 Once again, the Court's explanation seems
unlikely to clarify the pretext issue in a manner sufficient to avoid
confusion going forward.
The dispute between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Conner is a direct result of the uncertainty the Court has engendered in its suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence by failing
to identify clearly the purpose it finds improper and indiscriminately
using different terms to describe that purpose, by its ad hoc use of
numerous categories to analyze the cases while insisting that a
"closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches" exists, and by never confronting the fundamental issue of
whether a criminal purpose on the part of the government (however
described or defined) should matter when assessing the permissibility
of suspicionless search and seizure schemes. A review of the Court's
suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence and the role of government purpose in that jurisprudence demonstrates how the Court got
itself into this mess.
III.

THE BIRTH OF SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES: CONFUSION
ABOUT GOVERNMENT PURPOSE FROM THE START

The Court's decision in Camara marks the birth of suspicionless
searches. 5 4 In Camara,the Court extended the reach of the Fourth
Amendment to administrative inspection programs but watered down
50. Id. at 44 n.1.
51. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). Justice Rehnquist also cited Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128 (1978), an early case holding that the subjective intent of officers alone does
not make otherwise lawful conduct illegal or unconstitutional.
52. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 55 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
53. Id. at 45-46.
54. It represents the "birth" in the sense of being characterized as a search and
permitted by the Court. The same type of activity was at issue in Frank v. Maryland,
359 U.S. 360 (1959), overruled by Camarav. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523
(1967), but the Court held it not to be a search. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte,
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the protections of the Amendment by redefining probable cause and
adopting a balancing test that opened the door to suspicionless
searches. 55 The Court gave little guidance as to when this new balancing test could be utilized to excuse individualized suspicion. In
particular, the Court sent conflicting signals as to whether a noncriminal investigatory purpose for the government activity mattered
in determining whether the balancing test was appropriate and failed
to define "non-criminal" purpose, sowing the seeds of confusion that
grew into the current quagmire.
In Camara, the lessee of an apartment refused to permit a housing inspector to enter his apartment without a warrant and was criminally charged with "refusing to permit a lawful inspection." 5 6 The
first, and perhaps most important, holding of Camara was that the
Fourth Amendment-including the warrant requirement-governed
such routine, administrative inspection programs. 5 7 The Court rejected the idea that Fourth Amendment protections diminish when
the government is not engaged in "a search for 'evidence of criminal
action' which may be used to secure the [subject's] criminal conviction. .. "58 The Court refused to accept the "rather remarkable premise" that the Fourth Amendment issues at stake in such
428 U.S. 543, 561 (1976) (stating Camara makes clear that the Fourth Amendment
imposes no "irreducible requirement" of individualized suspicion).
55. In the words of one commentator, "Camarahad the seemingly paradoxical effect of both expanding the scope of Fourth Amendment protection beyond law enforcement while at the same time sanctioning broad suspicionless searches for
administrative purposes." Robert S. Logan, Note, The Reverse Equal ProtectionAnalysis: A New Methodology For "Special Needs" Cases, 68 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 447, 450
(2000); see also Peter S. Greenberg, The Balance of Interests Theory and the Fourth
Amendment: A Selective Analysis of Supreme Court Action Since Camara and See, 61
CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1013 (1973) (noting the most striking innovation of Camara-Seewas
in the probability requirement); Sundby, 72 MiNN. L. REV. at 392-94 (noting the Court's
effort to satisfy warrant clause gave reasonableness a foot in the door); Erik G. Luna,
Sovereignty and Suspicion, 48 DuKE L.J. 787, 795 (1999) (stating the Camara Court
clung to warrant requirement but expressly rejected need for predicate of individualized
suspicion). This paradoxical effect was magnified by the fact that the protections of the
warrant requirement the Court imposed for administrative inspection programs was
soon to be blunted by the creation of a "heavily regulated industry" exception, which
excused many administrative inspection schemes from that requirement. At the same
time, the balancing test the Court created was soon to expand beyond the "non-criminal" cases and beyond being a test for determining probable cause, and become the vehicle by which the Court determined the legality of many traditional law enforcement
activities. Thus, the Court extended the protections of the Fourth Amendment to "noncriminal" government activities, but later crafted an exception that exempted many
such schemes from the requirement, and created a balancing test that had a far greater
impact on traditional criminal investigation activities of the government.
56. Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 527 (1967).
57. See also Frank v. Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959) (permitting warrantless entry
by housing inspectors), overruled by Camara v. Mun. Court of San Francisco, 387 U.S.
523 (1967).
58. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
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administrative inspection programs were "merely 'peripheral"' 5 9 and
suggested the opposite was true, declaring, "[iit is surely anomalous to
say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by
the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior."60 But later cases seemed to permit this anomalous result, 6 1 and the Court's new primary purpose test is difficult to square
62
with the concern expressed in Camara.
The notion that Camara stands for the proposition that a noncriminal purpose permits suspicionless searches and seizures comes
from the portion of the Camara decision relating to probable cause.
Having found the Fourth Amendment, including the warrant requirement, 63 fully applicable to the administrative inspection program
before it, the Court was in a bind. The words of the Fourth Amendment are clear: "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable
cause ... ." Probable cause had always been understood to require
some level of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing. Because the administrative inspections were not premised on the existence of such
suspicion, probable cause as traditionally understood could not be established. Thus, the Court was forced to redefine probable cause. It
did so by equating probable cause with "reasonableness" and creating
a balancing test to determine reasonableness, declaring, "there can be
no ready test for determining reasonableness other than by balancing
64
the need to search against the invasion which the search entails."
By utilizing a balancing test, the Court eliminated any requirement of
a minimum quantum of individual suspicion and opened the door to
suspicionless searches and seizures.65
Analyzing the administrative inspection scheme before it, the
Court rejected the idea that probable cause required a showing that a
particular dwelling contained code violations. Instead, the Court concluded that, in this context, "area code enforcement inspections" were
"reasonable searches" that could be justified by its newly created balancing test. 66 It based this conclusion on the facts that such programs
59. Id. at 531-32.
60. Id. at 530.
61. See infra notes 208-328 and accompanying text.
62. See infra notes 347-55 and accompanying text.
63. The Court found the warrant requirement applicable because without a warrant, the "practical effect of this system is to leave the occupant subject to the discretion
of the official in the field." Camara,387 U.S. at 532.
64. Interestingly, the Court prefaced this statement with the word "unfortunately."
The Court gave no indication why it felt that the use of a balancing test to determine
reasonableness was unfortunate, or why it felt such a test was the only way to decide
reasonableness. Id. at 536-37.
65. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, at 231; Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 550.
66. The Court applied the balancing test as part of "new," suspicionless probable
cause analysis. Camara, 387 U.S. at 537.
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have a long history of judicial and public acceptance and that the public interest demands that dangerous conditions be abated or prevented
and the unlikelihood that any other "canvassing technique" would be
effective; finally, the conclusion was reached "because the inspections
are neither personalin nature nor aimed at the discovery of evidence of
crime, they involve a relatively limited invasion of the urban citizen's
67
privacy."
Because the Court did not clearly explain why an inspection not
aimed at the discovery of evidence of a crime necessarily could be
characterized as a "relatively limited invasion ... of privacy," this language spawned confusion about the relevance of a "non-criminal" purpose motivating a government search or seizure scheme. The Court's
reliance on the non-criminal purpose of the inspections to find a lesser
intrusion on privacy and to forgive individualized suspicion seemed to
contradict its earlier rejection of the argument that the non-criminal
nature of the inspection could justify less than the full protection of
the Fourth Amendment for housing and other regulatory inspections.
Professor LaFave proposed a reading of the opinion that explains this
apparent inconsistency. He asserts that although the Court's language was inartful, the Court likely was not suggesting that the noncriminal purpose of the search in and of itself made the search less
intrusive, but was simply making the point that given the purpose of
the search in this case-inspecting for civil code violations-as a practical matter the searches were likely to be less thorough and, therefore, a more limited intrusion. Professor LaFave points out such
searches likely would be relatively brief and not involve rummaging
through private papers and effects, would not cause apprehension in
the citizen or cause damage to the citizen's reputation, would not be
undertaken by armed officers "whose presence may lead to violence,"
and would not be conducted at any time of the day or night or by surprise. Professor LaFave criticized the Court's "failure to be more precise about the significance of the fact that evidence of a crime was not
68
sought."
That failure led to an inappropriate focus on government purpose
as the dividing line between permissible and impermissible suspicionless search schemes. The concern is not so much that schemes
with a "criminal purpose" will be unjustifiably struck down, but that a
"non-criminal purpose" will be viewed as "per se" less intrusive and
therefore sufficient to justify suspicionless searches and seizures with67. Id. (emphasis added).
68. LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, at 231. Professor Schulhofer offers a similar
reading: "Presumably, . . . the Court meant to stress not motivation but effects."
Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 93 (citing WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE
§10.1(b), at 606-07 (2d. ed. 1987)).
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out a careful assessment of the severity of the resulting intrusion. A
non-criminal purpose has to be relevant at some level. The Court obviously did not intend its decision in Camara to eliminate the requirement of individual suspicion from the Fourth Amendment entirely. In
its opinion, the Court stated that to apply the standard of reasonableness, "it is obviously necessary first to focus upon the governmental
interest which allegedly justifies [the] intrusion . .. "69 It pointed to
searches for specific stolen goods or contraband in a "criminal investigation" as an example of a government interest that would not justify
a broad suspicionless area search but instead required individual suspicion in the form of "probable cause to believe the goods were in a
particular dwelling." 70 Several more times in its opinion, the Court
justified utilizing a balancing test (without requiring some quantum of
individual suspicion) by distinguishing the case before it from "a
search pursuant to a criminal investigation." These statements certainly justify reading Camara as imposing a requirement that suspicionless searches and seizures are limited to "non-criminal
investigations," but there is little indication of how broad or narrow
that requirement was intended to be. At one end of the spectrum, by
its reference to "criminal investigation," the Court may have been referring narrowly to a search undertaken to gather evidence against a
particular individual relating to a particular crime. Thus, for "classic"
criminal searches of that sort, the Court was not willing to deviate
from traditional probable cause. But for other types of searches, the
Court would engage in balancing, meaning individual suspicion may
or may not be required. 7 1 At the other end of the spectrum, the Court
could have intended a broad meaning for "criminal investigation." In
other words, if a search is undertaken for any law enforcement purpose (as opposed to as a community caretaking function or for a health
and safety purpose) a minimum quantum of individual suspicion is
required. The failure of the Court to be specific about what type of
criminal or law enforcement purpose mattered in Camaracontinues to
cause confusion in the Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. Despite deciding dozens of cases, the Court has never clarified this central issue 72 and, as mentioned earlier, has exacerbated
69. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534.
70. Id. at 535.
71. Another way to view this is that for these classic searches, the balancing has
already been done, and requires probable cause. See Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives'
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989) (stating that "[iln most criminal cases, we strike this
balance in favor of the ... Warrant Clause" generally requiring probable cause).
72. In one of the Court's earliest opportunities to apply Camarato a suspicionless
search scheme, its schizophrenia about the relevance of criminal purpose in deciding
whether and how to apply the Fourth Amendment was on full display. In Wyman v.
James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), decided just four years after Camara, a welfare recipient
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brought a civil rights action challenging the termination of her benefits based on her
refusal to consent to a home visit by a case worker. The plaintiff contended that home
visits by government caseworkers were searches that violated the Fourth Amendment
because they were not supported by a warrant based on probable cause. The Court
began by recognizing that when a case involves an official intrusion into a home, "an
immediate and natural reaction is one of concern about Fourth Amendment rights and
the protection which that Amendment is intended to afford." Wyman, 400 U.S. at 316.
The Court quoted Justice White's statement in Camarathat "except in certain carefully
defined classes of cases, a search of private property without proper consent is 'unreasonable' unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant," and further noted
Justice White's observation that one's Fourth Amendment protection subsists apart
from his being suspected of criminal behavior. Id. at 317. Nevertheless, the Court then
ruled that "this natural and quite proper protective attitude" was not a factor in the
case before it, "for the seemingly obvious and simple reason" that the government conduct in the case was not a search "in the Fourth Amendment meaning of that term." Id.
The Court conceded that the visits were mandatory and that the purpose was "perhaps,
in a sense, both rehabilitative and investigative," but stated that it believed the investigative purpose had been given "too broad a character and far more emphasis than it
deserves if it is equated with a search in the traditional criminal law context." Id. It
pointed to the fact that the visitation itself was not "forced or compelled," and denial of
permission was not a criminal act. The only consequence was denial of welfare benefits
under the scheme. Justice White, the author of Camara,concurred in all but this portion of the majority opinion. Id. at 326 (White, J., concurring).
Perhaps uncertain of its conclusion that the government conduct was not a search,
the Court went on to state that even if it were to assume the home visit "does possess
some of the characteristics of a search in the traditional sense," the visit did not violate
the Fourth Amendment because it was not unreasonable. Id. at 318. The Court catalogued eleven factors supporting the conclusion that the visits were not unreasonable,
including that the visit was not made by police or uniformed authority, but by a
caseworker "whose primary objective is, or should be, the welfare, not the prosecution,
of the aid recipient for whom the worker has profound responsibility." Id. at 322-23.
The Court also stressed that the program "does not deal with crime or with the actual or
suspected perpetrators of crime" and, as a separate factor, emphasized that the "home
visit is not a criminal investigation, does not equate with a criminal investigation,
and... is not in aid of any criminal proceeding. Id. at 323. The Court stated that if the
visit should, by chance, lead to the discovery of fraud and a criminal prosecution, "that
is a routine and expected fact of life and a consequence no greater than that which
necessarily ensues upon any other discovery by a citizen of criminal conduct." Id. As a
final factor, the Court pointed to the inapplicability of the warrant procedure in part
because it "necessarily would imply conduct either criminal or out of compliance with an
asserted governing standard." Id. at 324. Of course, that was no longer true after
Camara. As Professor LaFave has stated, "the Camara reasoning would seem to be
equally applicable here, for the primary concern in this context is that the search be
related to a coherent policy followed by the agency and not merely an excuse for harassing a particular unpopular welfare recipient." LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 37, at 234.
The Court, having gone to the trouble to create a new, suspicionless probable cause
standard just four year earlier in Camara,acted as if such a concept were absurd and
necessarily prevented the application of the warrant requirement when individualized
suspicion was not part of the equation.
Aware of its apparent departure from Camara (and See), the Court explained that
both Camaraand See were decided "by a divided Court," but were not inconsistent with
the result in the present case. The Court stated that "each case arose in a criminal
context where a genuine search was denied and prosecution followed." Wyman, 400
U.S. at 324-25. But Camaraand See were treated as administrative searches, not criminal cases. The crime with which the defendants were charged was refusing government officials entry, not charges relating to evidence discovered during the search. The
Court seemed to be missing the larger concern of Camarathat "it is surely anomalous to
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the problem through "terminological inexactitude." 7 3 The more
broadly criminal purpose is read, obviously the greater impact it has
as a limit on suspicionless searches and seizures. If criminal purpose,
read broadly, prevents application of the balancing test and thus prevents suspicionless search and seizure schemes, many such schemes
will fall victim to the "purpose" test. Thus, if the Court wants to police
suspicionless search schemes and restrict their use, it could do so with
a broad criminal purpose test. If criminal purpose is read narrowlyas exemplified by "a search undertaken to gather evidence against a
particular individual relating to a particular crime"-the door is open
to a wide variety of schemes. In that case, if the Court desires to limit
the schemes, it has to create non-purpose limits. This is the heart of
the dispute between Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice O'Connor in
Edmond. Chief Justice Rehnquist reads the Court's opinion in Edmond as imposing a broad "non-law enforcement" test, a charge that
Justice O'Connor resists. 74 Although the label of "administrative or
regulatory search case" attached to Camara by the Court and commentators 75 suggests a broad reading of "criminal purpose" and a limited authority for suspicionless searches and seizures, the early cases
in the Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence suggest
a narrow reading and a limited role for "criminal purpose."

say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth
Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior." Camara, 387
U.S. at 530.
The Frank, Camara-See,and Wyman line of cases resemble a tennis match model of
constitutional jurisprudence, with the ball first on one side of the net and then the
other. Unlike Camara, which recognized its inconsistency with Frank and overruled
that case, the Court in Wyman distinguished Camara and suggested it was consistent
with that decision. But Wyman seems directly contrary to Camara and adds to the
confusion surrounding the importance of a non-criminal purpose behind a government
inspection scheme. Curiously, the Court has rarely cited Wyman in later cases dealing
with that issue. The initial holding of the case that the government conduct was not a
search limited the case's relevance as the Court later found most government schemes
to be searches governed by the Fourth Amendment; Wyman's dicta finding the conduct
not unreasonable has not played a significant role in later debates.
73. I use this term in its original sense of inexact or inaccuracte terminology,
rather than its more modern use as a euphemism for an outright lie. See supra notes
23-36 and accompanying text.
74. This debate raises two issues: who is correct about the type purpose test Edmond imposes (or will be read to impose) and, more fundamentally, which test is appropriate as a matter of Fourth Amendment policy and in light of the "evil" the Court
apparently seeks to avoid. See infra notes 268-94 and accompanying text.
75. See Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 475 n.31 (1971) (characterizing
Camaraand See as "administrative search" cases). See also, Greenberg, 61 CAL. L. REV.
at 1011-13 (same); Sundby, 72 MiNN.L. REV. at 406-07 (describing Camara'scharacterization as an administrative search).
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ADMINISTRATIVE SEARCHES AND BEYOND: THE
IMPORTANCE OF GOVERNMENT PURPOSE
POST-CAMARA

Although the Court in Camara created the balancing test in part
to provide an analytical framework for administrative or regulatory
searches in which the traditional notion of probable cause did not apply, the Court quickly extended the balancing test to criminal investigations, utilizing the test to uphold various police actions on
individualized suspicion amounting to less than probable cause. In its
very next term, in one of the first cases to apply Camara'sbalancing
test, the Court in Terry v.Ohio 76 utilized the test in the criminal investigation context to uphold stops and frisks on the basis of reasonable suspicion. 7 7 Greater confusion ensued around the question of
when individual suspicion would be excused entirely. Despite the
Court's statements in Camara that "it is surely anomalous to say that
the individual and his private property are fully protected by the
Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior," 78 there later developed a pervasive notion that a non-criminal purpose was the path to the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." This was understandable given the description of the conduct in Camara as an "administrative inspection" 79 and the Court's reliance on the non-criminal purposes of the inspection to excuse the lack of individualized suspicion.
As it decided various suspicionless search cases, the Court failed to
clarify the meaning or scope of what constituted a criminal investigatory purpose and sent confusing and conflicting signals on the effect of
the government purposes motivating the schemes. Although the Court
later would refer to the "closely guarded category of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches,"8 0 after Camara opened the door
to such searches, the Court decided numerous cases and upheld many
suspicionless search and seizure schemes, but never clearly defined a
single "category." Initially, the Court dealt with statutory inspection
programs easily classified as "administrative searches" of the type at
issue in Camara and with a clear "non-criminal" purpose. The focus
76. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
77. The application of Camarain the criminal investigation context was later extended to include "frisks" of automobiles, Michigan v.Long, 463 U.S. 1032 (1983), and
cursory inspections of homes following arrests on the premises. Maryland v. Buie, 494
U.S. 325 (1990).
78. Camara, 387 U.S. at 530.
79. Id. at 525.
80. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997); Ferguson v. City of Charleston,
532 U.S. 67, 77 (2001).
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in those cases was on whether a warrant was required.8 1 That such a
search could be conducted without individualized suspicion seemed a
given after Camara, fueling the idea that the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches" was defined by the "non-criminal" or administrative government purpose
motivating the scheme.8 2 But as the government sought to expand
the Camara balancing test beyond classic administrative inspection
schemes to intrusions more closely related to criminal investigation,
the Court in several different contexts faced the issue whether government purpose related to criminal law enforcement was relevant.
Rather than developing a well-defined category and a single coherent
doctrine, the Court seemed to decide simply these cases on a confusing
ad hoc basis,8 3 or at best in several rough "subcategories," sending
conflicting signals as to the importance of the government motive behind the scheme.

A.

EARLY CASES: TRAFFIC AND IMMIGRATION SEARCHES, SEIZURES,
AND CHECKPOINTS

The first group of cases in which the Court was urged to permit
suspicionless searches or seizures in settings beyond the classic administrative search schemes of the type at issue in Camara-aseries
of cases involving stops and searches of automobiles by border patrol
agents for the purpose of enforcing immigration laws-offers no support for a law enforcement purpose test. In fact, the cases suggest the
opposite. Although the Court characterized the government intrusions in the cases as "for law enforcement purposes," that purpose
played no role in the Court's assessment of whether the suspicionless
intrusions were permissible.8 4 Instead, the Court focused on the invasiveness of the government conduct and the level of discretion exercised by individual officers in the field in deciding whether to
authorize suspicionless searches 8 5
81. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, § 19.02 and n.21 (collecting cases where Court
found businesses to be "closely regulated" and therefore no warrant required).
82. It would be almost two decades before the effect of the government's purpose
behind a "classic" statutory administrative inspection scheme was questioned and addressed by the Court. See infra notes 194-207 and accompanying text (discussing New
York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)).
83. Tracey Maclin, Is Obtainingan Arrestee's DNA a Valid Special Needs Search
Under the Fourth Amendment? What Should (and Will) the Supreme Court Do?, J.L.
MED. & ETHICS, Spring 2005, at 102, 107.
84. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 656 (1979) ("The crucial distinction [in these
cases] was the lesser intrusion upon the motorist's Fourth Amendment interests.").
85. When the Court later created the "special needs" exception, however, some
courts and commentators suggested that, in hindsight, these early traffic/immigration
checkpoints were, in fact, special needs cases, in which government purpose played an
important role. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 2006); Nicholas v.
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To enforce immigration laws and prevent smuggling of illegal
aliens into the country, the government utilized permanent traffic
checkpoints, temporary traffic checkpoints, and roving patrols to conduct "surveillance," which entailed stops and searches for questioning.8 6 The government concededly undertook these activities without
individualized suspicion of violations8 7 and defended their actions by
"rel[ying] heavily on cases dealing with administrative inspections,"8 8
at that point the only type of case in which the Court had authorized
suspicionless searches. But the arguably non-criminal, administrative purpose behind the schemes was not the determining factor in
whether the Court found the searches valid.
In a series of decisions, the Court invalidated suspicionless stops
and searches by roving patrols and suspicionless searches at checkpoints, but upheld suspicionless stops at checkpoints. The government purpose behind the searches and seizures was the same in each
case and thus did not play a role in the distinction drawn by the Court
between lawful and unlawful suspicionless searches. The Court refused to authorize the first group of activities-searches by roving border patrols and at checkpoints-because of the unfettered discretion of
the officers in the field and the magnitude of the intrusions.8 9 Only
when the discretion was constrained at checkpoints and the intrusion
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 660-63 (2d. Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 384 (2006); Sundby,
74 Miss. L.J. at 520. The Court later rejected the idea that these cases were "special
needs" cases, but nevertheless injected government purpose into the equation when assessing the legality of later checkpoint cases. See infra notes 319-20 and accompanying

text.
86. See Almeida-Sanchez v. United States, 413 U.S. 266, 268 (1973).
87. The government relied on § 287(a)(3) of the Immigration and Nationality Act,
66 Stat. 233, 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(3), which provided for "warrantless searches of automobiles and other conveyances 'within a reasonable distance from any external boundary
of the United States,' as authorized by regulations to be promulgated by the Attorney
General. The Attorney General's regulation, 8 CFR § 287.1, defined 'reasonable distance' as 'within 100 air miles from any external boundary of the United States.'" Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 268.
88. As the Court stated, the government "understandably sidestep[ed] the automobile search cases" that would have forgiven a warrant, but required individualized suspicion. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270.
89. The Court later explained in Delaware v. Prouse that the crucial distinction
between the roving patrol and checkpoint cases was the lesser intrusion upon the motorist's Fourth Amendment interests, explaining "we view checkpoint stops in a different light because the subjective intrusion-the generating of concern or even fright on
the part of lawful travelers-is appreciably less in the case of a checkpoint stop."
Prouse, 440 U.S. at 656 (quoting United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 558
(1976)). The Court also rejected the government's attempt to analogize to the "heavily
regulated industries" exception, noting the "central difference between those cases and
this one is that businessmen engaged in such federally licensed and regulated enterprises accept the burdens as well as the benefits of their trade, whereas the petitioner
here was not engaged in any regulated or licensed business." Almeida-Sanchez, 413
U.S. at 271.
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limited to brief seizures did the Court authorize suspicionless
intrusions.
In the initial case involving a stop and search of a vehicle as part
of a roving patrol, Ameida-Sanchez v. United States,90 the Court rejected the government's attempt to bring the case within the rationale
of the administrative search cases not because of its law enforcement
purposes, but because the search was conducted in the "unfettered
discretion of the members of the Border Patrol" and "thus embodied
precisely the evil the Court saw in Camara when it insisted that the
'discretion of the official in the field' be circumscribed by obtaining a
warrant prior to the inspection."9 1 The reasoning and result were the
same in United States v. Ortiz, 92 when the searches took place at a
checkpoint rather than as part of a roving patrol. 93 The Court concluded that the checkpoints did not limit "to any meaningful extent"
the officer's discretion to select cars for search and did not "mitigate
the invasion of privacy that a search entails." 94 It was not the government purpose behind the checkpoints that troubled the Court, but the
manner in which the scheme was carried out and the invasion of privacy it entailed. Consistent with Professor LaFave's reading of the
importance of the non-criminal purpose in Camara, the Court made
the point that unlike the search scheme at issue in Camara,the "noncriminal" purpose of the searches in question did not serve to limit the
scope of the intrusion.9 5
When the intrusion at the checkpoint was limited to a stop rather
than a search, the Court was willing to uphold the government
scheme. But the Court's decision in United States v. MartinezFuerte9 6 was not
based on the purpose of the checkpoint scheme being
"non-criminal";9 7 the Court repeatedly described the checkpoint as being "for law enforcement purposes." 98 The Court relied on the limited
90. 413 U.S. 266 (1973).
91. Almeida-Sanchez, 413 U.S. at 270.
92. 422 U.S. 891 (1975).
93. On the issue of stops, as opposed to searches, by roving patrols, the Court applied the balancing test to require reasonable suspicion as opposed to probable cause to
justify such a stop. United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. 873 (1975).
94. United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S. 891, 896 (1975). The Court found that "a
search, even of an automobile, is a substantial invasion of privacy."
95. Ortiz, 422 U.S. at 895.
96. 428 U.S. 543 (1976).
97. The Court spent little time on this issue, stating simply that "the purpose of the
stop is legitimate and in the public interest." Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. at 562. Earlier
the Court had explained, "Our previous cases have recognized that maintenance of a
traffic checkpoint program in the interior is necessary because the flow of illegal aliens
cannot be controlled effectively at the border." Id. at 556.
98. The first sentence of the opinion states, "[t]hese cases involve criminal prosecutions for offenses relating to the transportation of illegal Mexican aliens." MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. at 545. The Court also stated, "[i]nterdicting the flow of illegal aliens
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intrusion on privacy that the brief detentions represented 9 9 and the
lack of discretion on the part of individual officers in deciding which
cars to detain. 10 0 In response to the defendants' argument that individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure, the Court reinforced the proposition that a non-law
enforcement purpose is not a prerequisite to excusing individual suspicion by analogizing it to the widely used and accepted practice of
similar stops at state and local levels to enforce laws regarding drivers' licenses, safety requirements, and the like. According to the
Court, these accepted practices were an apt analogy to the case before
it despite their non-law enforcement purpose: "The fact that the purpose of such laws is said to be administrative is of limited relevance in
weighing their intrusiveness on one's right to travel." 10 1
The Court affirmed the limited relevance of a non-criminal purpose and the controlling nature of the manner in which suspicionless
seizure schemes were carried out when it declared unconstitutional
random, suspicionless stops for purposes of license and registration
checks in Delaware v. Prouse.1 0 2 The intrusiveness of the roving patrol stops and the unlimited discretion exercised by the officer in the
field was crucial to the Court. The purpose of the stop did not change
the calculus. When the state attempted to distinguish the case from
the roving immigration stops (which the Court had characterized as
for law enforcement purposes) on the basis that the license and regisposes formidable law enforcement problems." Id. at 552. The Court also noted that "the
needs of law enforcement are furthered by this location." Id. at 562 n.15. And in upholding the "secondary inspection" of a limited number of cars the Court stated that
reliance on apparent Mexican ancestry "clearly is relevant to the law enforcement need
to be served." Id. at 564 n.17.
99. This was true on two levels. First, the intrusion on those stopped was minimal
because the detention was brief, neither the vehicle nor its occupants were searched,
and checkpoint stops were less likely to generate concern or fright on the part of lawful
travelers. The Court also considered the fact that routine checkpoints stops do not intrude on the motoring public as significantly as roving patrols because motorists using
the highways near the border are not taken by surprise by the checkpoints as they may
know, or obtain knowledge of, the location and will not be stopped elsewhere. MartinezFuerte, 428 U.S. at 557-60.
100. As to the initial stop at the checkpoint, every car was stopped. Only selected
cars were referred for secondary inspections, apparently at the discretion of the individual officers. The Court did not require any individual suspicion for this secondary procedure and found the discretion of the officers limited. Although that conclusion seems
highly debatable, it nevertheless is a conclusion based on factors other than the purpose
of the government action. In fact, the Court justified the referrals to the secondary
inspection on the basis of Mexican ancestry because it "clearly is relevant to the law
enforcement need to be served." Id. at 546 n.17.
101. Id. at 561 n.14. The Court was careful to state that since such laws were not
before it, it was intimating no view "respecting them," but noted "this practice of stopping automobiles briefly for questioning has a long history evidencing its utility and is
accepted by motorists as incident to highway use." Id.
102. 440 U.S. 648 (1979).
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tration checks advanced the state's interest in roadway safety as opposed to the state's interest in fighting crime, the Court rejected the
argument, stating, "Only last Term we pointed out that 'if the government intrudes . . . the privacy interest suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws or
breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards." 10 3 The Court
was unwilling to subject citizens to "unfettered government intrusion"
every time they utilized an automobile, which the Court characterized
as a "basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to
and from one's home, workplace, and leisure activities."' 0 4 Once
again, the Court intimated that a checkpoint to check license and registration would be permissible because the intrusion on privacy
would be less and the discretion of the individual officer would be limited. But the distinction had nothing to do with the purpose of the
stop.' 0 5 Perhaps more important for purposes of critiquing the Edmond primary purpose test, the Court suggested that just as a noncriminal purpose could not validate the stop, a law enforcement purpose would not defeat it. When the state tried to bolster its case in
Prouse by arguing the activity also furthered the state interest of apprehending stolen motor vehicles, the Court did not label such a purpose improper; it simply characterized it as "not distinguishable from
the general interest in crime control," apparently suggesting that such
an interest added little to the state's side of the ledger for purposes of

balancing. 106
These initial cases applying Camara suggest a suspicionless
search and seizure jurisprudence in which a law enforcement or criminal purpose on the part of the government plays an extremely limited
role.' 0 7 The "gateway" to the category of permissible suspicionless
searches and seizures is not a "non-law enforcement" or "non-criminal" government purpose. It is demonstrating circumstances that

103. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (quoting Marshall v. Barlow's,
Inc., 436 U.S. 307, 312-13 (1978)).
104. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 662.
105. See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 97 ("The [Prouse] opinion rejected, as had
Camara,the notion that a regulatory motivation diminishes the intrusive quality of the
search.").
106. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 659 n.18. Later, in City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531
U.S. 32 (2000), the Court read this language differently to support imposing its primary
purpose test. See infra note 267.
107. This is particularly supported by the Court's ruling on the secondary inspection
in Martinez-Fuerte. The Court justified the secondary inspections because "intrusion
here is sufficiently minimal that no particularized reason need exist to justify it" even
though it recognized the secondary inspection served a "law enforcement need." Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. at 563, 564 n.17.
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make developing individual suspicion unfeasible or impractical. ' 0 8 In
those circumstances, the Court will utilize the balancing test to determine whether the government interest is sufficiently important to justify the suspicionless intrusion. The crucial factor in the balancing
test is not the purpose of the search, but whether safeguards other
than a requirement of individual suspicion exist to protect the citizen.
As the Court stated in Prouse, "In those situations in which the balance of interests precludes insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon to assure
that the individual's expectation of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the officer in the field. '" 10 9
The immigration/traffic checkpoint cases demonstrated the Court
was more inclined to allow a suspicionless intrusion when it was not
at the discretion of the officer in the field and when it intruded less on
privacy because it did not involve a home or office, did not cause a high
level of subjective concern in the citizen, and did subject citizens to a
search every time they engaged in "basic, pervasive, and often necessary" activities. Following these cases, it would seem that the Court's
suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence would focus on these
factors, not the purpose of the intrusion. 1 10 But suspicionless search
and seizure cases decided by the Court in other contexts muddied the
water by utilizing government purpose to varying degrees in assessing
the validity of the government conduct at issue.
B.

MORE EARLY SUSPICIONLESS SEARCH AND SEIZURE CASES:
INVENTORY SEARCHES

At the same time the Court was deciding the validity of suspicionless search and seizures for immigration purposes by roving patrols and at checkpoints, it was addressing another type of
suspicionless search: the inventory search. In South Dakota v. Opperman,"' the Court upheld suspicionless, warrantless "inventory
108. Explaining its decision not to permit suspicionless stops by roving Border Patrol agents, the Court explained, because, "the nature of illegal alien traffic and the
characteristics of smuggling operations tend to generate articulable grounds for identifying violators [ ], a requirement of reasonable suspicion for stops allows the Government adequate means of guarding the public interest and also protects residents of the
border areas from indiscriminate official interference." Brignoni-Ponce, 422 U.S. at 883.
This rationale seems to be precisely what Justice Blackmun was attempting to articulate in New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985), when he referred to "special needs
beyond the normal needs of law enforcement" and a "special law enforcement need for
greater flexibility." See infra notes 145-56 and accompanying text.
109. Prouse, 440 U.S. at 654-55.
110. This is generally the approach the Court took in deciding whether intrusions in
the criminal investigatory context could be justified on individual suspicion less than

probable cause. See Davis v. Mississippi, 394 U.S. 721 (1969).
111.

428 U.S. 364 (1976).
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searches" of impounded automobiles conducted pursuant to a standard policy. Given the Court's characterization of the government conduct in Opperman as a "routine administrative function," 1 12 a label
virtually synonymous with its characterization of the conduct in
Camara as both "routine" and "administrative," 13 it seems the case
should have been analyzed using the Camara precedent. 1 14 The
Court apparently saw it differently. First, it expressly distinguished
Camaraon the issue of whether a warrant was required, utilizing the
distinction between automobiles and homes or offices previously
drawn by the Court based on the mobility of automobiles and the significantly reduced expectation of privacy that citizens enjoy in their
cars. 1 15 Having distinguished Camara for warrant requirement purposes, the Court refused to equate "reasonableness" with "probable
cause" as the Court in Camara had done. The Opperman Court
viewed "the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness" as distinct from probable cause, which it read to require individual suspicion. It rejected probable cause (including individual suspicion) as a
measure of reasonableness because "[t]he standard of probable cause
is peculiarly related to criminal investigations, not routine, noncriminal procedures" and therefore is "unhelpful when analysis centers
upon the reasonableness of routine administrative caretaking func-

tions.

.... "116

The Court then decided the "reasonableness" of the

112. While the Court in Camara emphatically rejected the notion that the non-criminal nature of the government intrusion permitted classifying it as not a search, the
Opperman Court seemed ready to backtrack and find inventory inspections not to be
searches. The Court cited Wyman v.James, 400 U.S. 309 (1971), and noted that although some states had concluded that "[gliven the benign noncriminal context of the
intrusion . . . an inventory does not constitute a search for Fourth Amendment purposes," the government "has expressly abandoned the contention that the inventory in
this case is exempt from the Fourth Amendment standard of reasonableness." South
Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 370 (1976).
113. The Court referred to the government conduct in Camaravariously as a "routine area inspection," "routine periodic inspection," "routine systematized inspection,"
"routine inspection," and a "routine annual inspection," as well as an "administrative
inspection program" and "administrative searches." Camara,387 U.S. at 525, 526, 530,
533, 534, 535-36, 539.
114. Just months earlier, in the same term, the Court relied on Camara to uphold
suspicionless seizures at traffic checkpoints for immigration purposes in United States
v. Martinez-Fuerte,428 U.S. 543 (1976).
115. The Court explained that while Camara required a warrant for administrative
entry and inspection of private dwellings or commercial premises, that "procedure has
never been held applicable to automobile inspections for safety purposes." Opperman,
428 U.S. at 367-68 n.2.
116. Id. at 370 n.5. This statement seems directly contrary to the Court's statement
in Camarathat probable cause is "the standard by which a particular decision to search
is tested against the constitutional mandate of reasonableness." The Opperman Court's
rejection of probable cause as the standard likely was due to its desire to avoid a requirement of individualized suspicion. But that narrow view of probable cause ignored
the "redefinition" of probable cause in Camarato include "reasonableness" based on a
balancing of the state and individual interests. The Opperman Court could have
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search without utilizing the Camara balancing test"17-the Court
never even used the words "balance" or "balancing." 118 Rather than
assessing whether inventory searches fell within the "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," the
1 19
Court seemed to create a separate category.
More important than the fact that the Court was assessing "reasonableness" as a separate standard apart from probable cause was
the fact that in order to utilize this reasonableness test and excuse
individualized suspicion, the Court seemed to impose a requirement of
a "non-criminal" government purpose. In addition to rejecting the
standard of probable cause as "peculiarly related to criminal investigations," the Court emphasized that its conclusion that the searches
were justified without individual suspicion depended in part on the
fact that "no claim is made that the protective procedures are a subterfuge for criminal investigations" and that there was "no suggestion
whatever that this standard procedure... was a pretext concealing an
investigatory motive.' 20 By suggesting a "non-criminal" purpose limitation, Opperman supports the view that a non-criminal government
purpose matters in assessing suspicionless search and seizure
adopted the Camara definition of probable cause, balanced the interests, and come to
the same conclusion it did: that inventory searches of impounded vehicles pursuant to
standard policies are not unreasonable, even in the absence of individualized suspicion.
Instead, the Court rejected probable cause as a standard for reasonableness and simply
analyzed the "reasonableness" of the inventory by enumerating the government interests justifying the procedure, noting the reduced expectation of privacy in automobiles,
and pointing to the consistent decisions of the Court and lower courts upholding similar
procedures. See generally South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364 (1976).
117. The majority cited Camara in a footnote only to illustrate its contention that
"the expectation of privacy with respect to one's automobile is significantly less that
that relating to one's home or office." Opperman, 428 U.S. at 367, 367-68 n.2.
118. Despite not explicitly using a balancing test, it seemed the Court was balancing
the interests. Nevertheless, Justice Powell concurred in the judgment in Opperman,
but wrote separately to emphasize the need to follow Camara and undertake a balancing of interests. Id. at 376-84 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Marshall, in a dissenting
opinion, also stressed the need to balance the interests of the government against the
intrusion on citizens and stated, 'the Court fails clearly to articulate the reasons for its
reconciliation of these interests in this case. . . ." Id. at 385 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
In later inventory cases, the Court explicitly utilized a balancing test but continued to
ignore Camara. See Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983).
119. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, § 16.01[B] (characterizing inventory searches as
a separate category and explaining this resulted "largely for historical reasons").
120. Opperman, 428 U.S. at 377. This language and similar language in other inventory cases was relied on by one of the leading commentators who argued that the
Supreme Court would strike down pretextual searches when presented with the opportunity, a prediction that was proved inaccurate in Whren. See John M. Burkoff, The
Pretext Search Doctrine Returns After Never Leaving, 66 U. DET. L. REV. 363, 394-99
(1989) (arguing Opperman,Lafayette and Bertine support the contention that the Court
would invalidate pretextual searches on a case-by-case basis based on the motive of the
officer).
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schemes. 12 1 However, in Edmond, the Court did not rely on Opperman or other inventory search cases to support its new primary purpose test. For reasons that are not apparent, the Court has treated
inventory searches as a separate category of intrusion unrelated to the
"closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches and seizures" spawned by Camara.1 22 To some extent, this
"outlier" status as a separate category suggests Opperman is of limited relevance in assessing the Court's suspicionless search and
seizure jurisprudence. But that very status demonstrates the fantasy
of a single category of "constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches and seizures." Even when the Court admits to several "classifications" of permissible suspicionless searches, it generally omits inventory searches. 1 23 This treatment of inventory searches is further
evidence of the mess the Court has made of its suspicionless search
and seizure jurisprudence, but it also demonstrates the Court's facility
in simply creating a separate category if it serves its purposes to ignore the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches" it touts. Even more important for purposes of
assessing the Court's new primary purpose test, the transformation of
the role of "non-criminal" purpose in the inventory search doctrine
serves as a cautionary tale. As developed in the inventory cases, the
"non-criminal purpose" limitation is a particularly ineffective one, 12 4 a
fate that the primary purpose test may come to share.
By emphasizing that there was "no suggestion" of a criminal investigatory motive in Opperman, the Court seemed to suggest that if
criminal investigation played any role-and certainly if it played asignificant or primary role-in motivating the search, the result would
change and the search would be found unlawful. Such a rule would
seem to exclude "mixed motive" searches from the "category" of permissible suspicionless searches. This is important for purposes of assessing the Court's new test because a primary purpose test, by
definition, permits mixed motive searches. Mixed motive searches are
121. In one respect, it was necessary for the Court to limit the search in Opperman
to non-criminal purpose-if it had been a search for evidence of a crime, the prevailing
law would seem to require the police to have probable cause to believe the evidence
would be found in the car.
122. The Court seemed to confirm investigatory searches are a separate category in
later cases. In Illinois v. Lafayette, the Court upheld an inventory search without citing
Camara and described inventory searches as a "well-defined exception." Lafayette, 462
U.S. at 643.
123. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 37-38 (2000); see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 308-09 (1997).
124. This makes keeping distance between the inventory searches and other suspicionless search and seizure categories necessary if the Court intends to enforce a strong
non-criminal purpose test in those other categories. See infra notes 130-31 and accompanying text.
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searches where, in the inventory context for example, the police have
some idea (not sufficient to justify a search) that a car contains evidence of criminal wrongdoing and utilize a different violation to impound the car and conduct an inventory search. If such a car is
parked illegally, may the police take advantage of that fact and tow
and inventory the car? Such behavior seems to justify the owner alleging that the inventory was a "subterfuge for criminal investigation"
or "a pretext concealing an investigatory motive," arguably taking the
search outside the category of constitutionally permissible searches
the Court created in Opperman. If the Court intended that result, it
would create the anomaly the Court warned against in Camara-an
individual suspected of a crime would receive greater protection under
the Fourth Amendment than a citizen not suspected of wrongdoing. If
the police tow and inventory the car of someone suspected of criminal
activity, that individual has a potential challenge to the search (pretext); the "innocent" citizen does not.
But the limitation on government purpose imposed by the Opperman Court is less than it seems. The Court clarified the rule to prevent the "anomalous" result in a later inventory search case, Colorado
v. Bertine.12 5 In Bertine, the defendant was taken into custody for
driving under the influence of alcohol. While awaiting the tow truck
to take Bertine's van to the impound lot, a backup officer inventoried
the contents of the van, including a closed backpack he found directly
behind the front seat of the van, and discovered drugs, drug paraphernalia, and cash that was used to prove narcotics charges against
126
Bertine.
In upholding the inventory search of the van and backpack, the
Court emphasized that "as in Opperman . . . , there was no showing
that the police ... acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation." 12 7 By limiting "pretextual" searches to those in which the
criminal investigatory motive is the sole purpose, the Court made
clear that "mixed motive" inventory searches were within the exception and lawful. 128 Upholding "mixed motive" cases as legal avoids the
anomaly that the Camara Court warned of-that citizens enjoy the
full protection of the Fourth Amendment only when they are suspected of criminal activity-but it does so by reducing the "full protection" of the Amendment for everyone. It insures citizens not suspected
125. 479 U.S. 367 (1987). Bertine was the first suspicionless search case decided
after New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985); it was decided two years after that case.
See infra notes 157-61 and accompanying text.
126. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 368-69 (1987).
127. Bertine, 479 U.S. at 372.
128. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, § 16.02[A].

CREIGHTON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40

of criminal activity and those who are suspected are treated the
same-neither can challenge the intrusion.
Of course, if the citizen suspected of criminal activity can prove
that such suspicions were the "sole" purpose of the intrusion, the
anomaly is back-that suspected citizen can challenge the search but
the non-suspected citizen cannot. But it is very unlikely that a suspected citizen will be able to prove criminal investigation was the
"sole" purpose for the officer's conduct. If she is able to do that, arguably the search is no longer an inventory (or other regulatory-type)
search, and the anomaly disappears because the different treatment
theoretically is not based on the purpose of the search, but on the type
of search. Neither citizen is protected from suspicionless inventory
searches; both are protected from suspicionless automobile searches.
But if the intrusion is the same, why should purpose matter? That it
should not is the lesson of Whren, and perhaps also of Camara.
Professor LaFave's view of the Camara language was that the
purpose of the search in that case was relevant only because as a practical matter it limited the intrusion. The same is true of the inventory
searches. The non-criminal purpose limits the scope of the search to
that specified in the standard policy being followed, typically "areas in
which valuables . . . customarily are stored." If the search does not
exceed those areas, the logic of Whren suggests it is a proper inventory
search regardless of the purpose of the officer-primary or sole-and
lawful if a basis (e.g. a parking violation) existed for impounding and
inventorying, whether or not the parking violation motivated the officer. One wonders if the Court would not apply Whren to this situation if it ever faced it. Although the Court has emphasized that Whren
applies only to searches analyzed under "ordinary, probable-cause
Fourth Amendment analysis,"1 29 it seems consistent with Whren to
find that the motivation of the individual officer in exercising her authority to impound and inventory a car are irrelevant provided, as in
Whren, the objective facts existed to justify an officer exercising the
authority.13 0 This suggests that even the sole purpose test the Court
nominally imposed in the inventory context may not survive. What
does it mean for the primary purpose test?
The important point is that the "purpose" test imposed on the inventory cases is a very limited one, eliminating only those cases where
the "sole purpose" of the police conduct is criminal investigation. That
129. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996).
130. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46 (noting that the Court's analysis in Whren was
extended in Bond v. United States, 529 U.S. 334 (2000), to an "analytical rubric" that
was not "ordinary probable cause Fourth Amendment analysis" in part because precedent required the Court to focus "on the objective effects of the actions of the individual
officer").
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is a very different "purpose" test than the "primary purpose" test the
Court nominally has imposed on the suspicionless search scheme in
Edmond. Given the similarity of the government conduct-conducting searches and seizures pursuant to neutral procedures without
individualized suspicion of criminal wrongdoing-one has to wonder
why two categories are needed or even appropriate. Even if the Court
intends and retains separate tests, the evolution of the Court's concern in the Opperman inventory case with a possible "suggestion of a
pretext concealing an investigatory motive" to the "sole purpose" test
for the inventory category in Bertine may provide insight into how the
13 1
new "primary purpose" test eventually will be interpreted.
Even if both the sole purpose test of the inventory cases and the
Edmond primary purpose test survive in their current form, at this
point a lawyer trying to define a single "category" of cases that permitted suspicionless searches and seizures without individualized suspicion would be hard pressed. But the Court was not through. If the
inventory search cases are outliers that should not confuse the analysis of the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," that label cannot be attached to the next group of
cases the Court decided-the "special needs" cases.
V. SPECIAL NEEDS-DEFINING THE CATEGORY?
If there is a seminal case (other than Camara)in the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence, it is New Jersey v. TLO. 1 32 Almost
two decades after deciding Camara, the Court (or at least Justice
Blackmun in his concurring opinion) in T.L.O. seemed to lay the
groundwork for the Court to define the "category" of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches. Somewhat paradoxically, this
happened even though T.L.O. did not involve a suspicionless intrusion
by the government. Nor did it involve an administrative inspection
program or a regulatory search pursuant to a statutory scheme.
Rather, the case was a challenge to an ad hoc decision by a school
official to search a student's purse based on suspicion of a violation of
school rules and criminal laws. Nevertheless, not only was the case
later viewed as an application of the Court's administrative or regula131. Even if the Court retains the primary purpose test over the sole purpose test,
the limitation may still be without teeth if courts are unwilling to examine critically the
articulated purposes of the government executing the search or seizure in question. In
that case, the government need only articulate a non-criminal purpose as its primary
purpose to mask its "true" purpose, now labeled "secondary" See supra notes 283-94
and accompanying text.
132. 469 U.S. 325 (1985). As mentioned earlier, many discussions of suspicionless
searches start with T.L.O. See Dodson, 51 S.C. L. REV. at 259 (stating the special needs
exception is one of the most "striking and sweeping"); see also Schulhofer, 1989 SUP. CT.
REV. at 99 (noting T.L.O. marks a watershed).
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tory search doctrine, 13 3 it spawned an analysis-the "special needs"
doctrine-some viewed as preempting the field and defining the "category" of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches,' 3 4 and including a "non-law enforcement" purpose limitation. But T.L.O. and
the cases that followed do not support that characterization.
In T.L.O., the Court upheld a search of a student's purse by school
authorities without a warrant and without probable cause. 13 5 In his
majority opinion, Justice White proceeded directly to a balancing test
as the appropriate test for assessing government conduct subject to
the Fourth Amendment's proscriptions, declaring, "[tihe determination of the standard of reasonableness governing any specific class of
searches requires 'balancing the need to search against the invasion
136
which the search entails.'"
In striking the balance, 13 7 the Court concluded that "the accommodation of the privacy interests of schoolchildren with the substantial need of teachers and administrators for freedom to maintain order
in the schools does not require strict adherence to the requirement
that searches be based on probable cause to believe that the subject of
the search has violated or is violating the law." 13 s The Court held
that a search of a student by a teacher or other school official was
justified when "there are reasonable grounds for suspecting that the
search will turn up evidence that the student has violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school."' 3 9
133. See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 107-123 (discussing the effect of T.L.O.
on the Court's administrative search doctrine).
134. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (upholding suspicionless
searches of New York City subway passengers; citing T.L.O. to explain that although in
previous similar cases it had "lodged our decision within the broad rubric of reasonableness," that reasoning "came to be known as the 'special needs exception'"); Nicholas v.
Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating special needs exception has increasingly become the test employed by the Supreme Court in suspicionless search cases),
cert. denied, 127 S.Ct. 384 (2006); see also Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662 (7th
Cir. 1999) ("[Tlhe Supreme Court has insisted that 'to be reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment a search must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,' save in
cases of 'special need' based on 'concerns other than crime detection.'"), affd sub nom.
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 48 (2000); Maclin, J.L. MED. & ETHICS,
Spring 2005, at 109 ("[A] majority of the Court soon adopted [the] special needs formula
as the controlling standard for measuring the constitutionality of suspicionless searches
outside of traditional law enforcement contexts."); Brief of the States of Pennsylvania,
Arkansas, et al. as Amici Curiae in Support of Respondent at 8, Samson v. California,
126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006) (No. 04-9728), 2006 WL 138387 (characterizing the exceptions to
the general rule requiring individual suspicion as "based on special needs, beyond the
normal need for law enforcement").
135. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343-48 (1985).
136. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 337.
137. The Court easily determined that the warrant requirement was particularly
unsuited to the school setting. Id. at 340.
138. Id. at 341.
139. Id. at 342.
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Although application of the balancing test resulted in a requirement of individualized suspicion in the case before it, the Court explained in a footnote that it was not deciding whether "individualized
suspicion is an essential element of the reasonableness standard we
adopt for searches by school authorities." 140 Justice White's suggestion, or reaffirmation, that the balancing test could authorize suspicionless searches, combined with his suggestion that the Camara
balancing test provided the appropriate analysis for assessing any
Fourth Amendment conduct by the government, provided the basis for
14 1
a broad expansion of the suspicionless search category.
Had the Court faced the issue of whether individualized suspicion
was an essential element of the reasonableness test, the determination whether the government should be freed from the requirement of
individualized suspicion likely would have depended not on the purposes of the search, but on the degree to which the search invaded
privacy. After once again noting the general rule that "'some quantum of individualized suspicion is usually a prerequisite to a constitutional search or seizure,"' the Court explained that exceptions to that
rule "are generally appropriate only where the privacy interests implicated by the search are minimal and where 'other safeguards' are
available 'to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of pri' 142
vacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the official in the field. "
Once again, the Court was suggesting the path to the "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches" was a
demonstration of a limited infringement on expectations of privacy
and the existence of safeguards to substitute for individual suspicion,
not a demonstration of a non-criminal or non-law enforcement purpose motivating the intrusion. This was even more clear in the
Court's response to the state's argument that the Fourth Amendment
was intended only to regulate searches and seizures by law enforcement officers. The Court rejected the argument, stating, "[blecause
the individual's interest in privacy and personal security 'suffers
whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of
criminal laws or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,'
it would be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth Amendment only when the individual is suspected of criminal behavior.'"'14 3 As it was, the Court
justified excusing the government from "strict adherence to the requirement that searches be based on probable cause" on the basis of
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 342 n.8.
See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REv. at 100.
T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 342 n.8.
Id. at 335 (citations omitted).
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the lesser expectation of privacy enjoyed by students, not the purpose
of the search, which was, in part, to investigate for evidence of criminal behavior and resulted in delinquency proceedings against the
144
student.
Justice Blackmun tried to limit Justice White's apparent expansion of the use of the balancing test. He wrote a concurring opinion
because he believed the Court had "omit[ted] a crucial step in freeing
the government from the strict application of the "Fourth Amendment's Warrant and Probable-Cause Clause." 14 5 He explained that
the Court had and should use the balancing test "only when we are
confronted with a 'special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."1 4 6 Utilizing a phrase that would come to define the "category" of
suspicionless searches, he elaborated, "[o]nly in those exceptional circumstance in which special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement
impracticable, is a court entitled to substitute its balancing of interests for that of the Framers." 14 7 At the outset, it is important to make
two points about Justice Blackmun's "special needs" analysis, an analysis that would play such an important role in later suspicionless
search and seizure cases. First, Justice Blackmun was proposing the
"special needs" analysis as a limit on the Court utilizing the balancing
test, not as a means of determining when it was appropriate to forgive
individualized suspicion. Second, he was not referring to "non-law enforcement" purposes when he used the term "special needs."' 48
144. Id. at 341. Justice Powell, in his concurring opinion, in which Justice O'Connor
joined, explained that he would place greater emphasis on the special characteristics of
elementary and secondary schools, including the lesser expectation of privacy enjoyed
by students, to justify granting protection less than probable cause. Id. at 348 (Powell,
J., concurring). Justice Brennan also expressed the view that the probable cause standard could only be relaxed if the government conduct in question represented a limited
invasion of privacy. Id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting). See also Dodson, 51 S.C. L.
REV. at 259 ("Initially, the Court justified the doctrine by reasoning that schoolchildren
have a diminished expectation of privacy while at school."). The Court did note in a
footnote that it was expressing no opinion on the legality of searches conducted in conjunction with or at the request of law enforcement agencies, a distinction some lower
courts had found dispositive. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 341 n.7.
145. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
146. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring).
147. Id. (Blackmun, J., concurring). Justice Brennan similarly sought to limit the
use of the balancing test to excuse a warrant "[o]nly where the governmental interests
at stake exceed those implicated in any ordinary law enforcement context-that is, only
where there is some extraordinary governmental interest involved-is it legitimate to
engage in a balancing test to determine whether a warrant is indeed necessary." Id. at
357 (Brennan, J., dissenting). In Justice Brennan's view, such an extraordinary interest was involved in the school setting, but he would forgive only a warrant, not probable
cause. Id. (Brennan, J., dissenting).
148. See Maclin, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Spring 2005, at 108.
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Justice Blackmun's "special needs" terminology soon would be
adopted by a majority of the Court, 14 9 but in doing so, its meaning and
application changed. As conceived by Justice Blackmun, a demonstration of "special needs" was the only way the Court could be freed from
the Warrant Clause's probable cause requirement, and thus the only
path for utilizing a balancing test. Twice he emphasized that the
Court was free to utilize the balancing test only when confronted with
a special or extraordinary need on the part of law enforcement. 150 If
the restriction had held, it would have brought some clarity to the debate over whether Fourth Amendment intrusions should be assessed
utilizing the Warrant Clause or the balancing test. And to the extent
that the only way to uphold suspicionless searches and seizures was
through the balancing test, the special needs requirement also would
have limited that category of searches. But "special needs" eventually
came to be treated as simply one of several types of searches within
the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," and was utilized not as a limit on applying the balancing test, but as a justification for excusing individual suspicion. 15 1
Even more curiously, "special needs" came to mean "non-law enforcement purposes." But Justice Blackmun was not limiting the category
of special needs to non-law enforcement purposes. Earlier he had
identified the situation in which the Court was justified in utilizing
the balancing test as those situations where the Court was confronted
with a "special law enforcement need for greater flexibility."15 2 He
was concerned with situations in which the practicalities of the situation prevented the application of the warrant and probable cause requirement. And he did not view these situations as limited to those in
which the police were not seeking evidence of criminal activity. As an
example of such a "special need" he pointed to the need for law enforcement officers to take immediate steps to assure their safety when
stopping individuals, justifying the "stop and frisk" tactic upheld in
Terry-a classic criminal investigatory situation. 15 3 Interestingly, especially in light of the Court's later characterization of traffic check149. In Ferguson v.City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67 (2001), the Court described the
Court in O'Connorv. Ortega,480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion), as having "adopted
the special needs terminology." Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 74 n.7.
150. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
151. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652 (2005) (describing this transformation); see
also MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260 (2d Cir. 2006) (applying the exception in this
fashion).
152. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 351 (Blackmun, J., concurring) (emphasis added).
153. Id. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring). In particular, in the case before the
Court, Justice Blackmun identified the school setting and the need for teachers to be
able to take immediate action as the "special need" justifying departure from the Warrant Clause (but not individualized suspicion), not the purpose of the government in
undertaking the particular search, which was, of course, to discover evidence of criminal
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points cases as not being special needs cases, Justice Blackmun also
cited Martinez-Fuerte, as well as Camara.154 Justice Blackmun was
advocating the "special needs" test as a means to restrict the use of the
balancing test. He was not limiting special needs to non-law enforcement purposes (even in the narrow sense), nor was he proposing the
test as the path to suspicionless searches. 155 But this aspect of Justice Blackmun's opinion seemed to get lost in later cases adopting his
new "category," and the "special needs" category came to be viewed as
a justification for upholding suspicionless searches, and "special
156
needs" was read to mean a non-law enforcement purpose."
VI.

FOUR CASES: THE MYTH OF A SINGLE CATEGORY AND
MORE CONFUSION ABOUT GOVERNMENT PURPOSE

Four cases decided within six months of each other shortly after
T.L.O. support the proposition that the special needs doctrine-even
when adopted by a majority of the Court-was not meant to define a
single category of suspicionless searches and was not meant to impose
a non-law enforcement purpose requirement. Only two of the four
cases involved suspicionless searches; the other two involved searches
based on reasonable cause or suspicion. The Court utilized its new
special needs doctrine not in the suspicionless search cases, but in the
cases involving searches based on reasonable suspicion, and analyzed
the two suspicionless search cases as falling into completely different
categories.
The first "suspicionless search" case after T.L.O. was Colorado v.
Bertine,15 7 the inventory case discussed earlier. If the Court intended
its new "special needs" doctrine to define the "closely guarded category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," Bertine
presented a good opportunity to apply the new doctrine. 158 In Opperbehavior and resulted in delinquency charges. Id. at 352-53 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
See also, Maclin, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Spring 2005, at 108.
154. T.L.O., 469 U.S. at 352 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
155. Justice Blackmun made this clear in his dissent in Griffin v. Wisconsin: "The
presence of special law enforcement needs justifies resort to the balancing test, but it
does not preordain the necessity of recognizing exceptions to the warrant and probablecause requirement." Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 881 (1987) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See infra notes 190-93 and accompanying text.
156. This transformation seemed to occur in O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709
(1987). In that case, a majority of the Court (four members of the plurality and Justice
Scalia) adopted the special needs test and seemed to read the test to require a non-law
enforcement purpose. Justice Blackmun, in his dissent, made clear he viewed special
needs as practical necessities that excused the Warrant Clause, no matter what the
government's purpose. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 732-48 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
157. 479 U.S. 367 (1987).
158. As described earlier, in Bertine, the defendant was taken into custody for driving under the influence of alcohol. While awaiting the tow truck to take defendant's van
to the impound lot, a backup officer inventoried the contents of the van, including a
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man, its previous inventory case, the Court had justified the inventory
search based largely on the special needs facing police officers who tow
and store automobiles. 15 9 And the inventory situation fit within the
analysis suggested by the early checkpoint cases and Justice Blackmun's special needs doctrine16 0-a situation where probable cause is
inapplicable and other safeguards (the standard inventory policy and
procedures) are in place to limit the discretion of individual officers in
the field. But rather than bringing inventory searches within the category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches by applying the special needs doctrine, the Court simply relied on the principle
that "inventory searches are now a well-defined exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 16 x Of course, had inventory searches not been kept separate from other suspicionless
searches, the Court later would have been required to reconcile the
"sole purpose" law enforcement test of the inventory cases with its
new "primary purpose" test. Keeping the situations separate avoids
that problem, but it certainly casts doubt on the Court's insistence
that it has closely guarded a single category of permissible suspicionless searches and seizures.
Slightly more than two months after deciding Bertine without reference to T.L.O. or "special needs," a plurality of the Court invoked
Justice Blackmun's "special needs" doctrine for the first time in
O'Connor v. Ortega.162 Like T.L.O., Ortega was not a suspicionless
search case; it involved the search of a government employee's office
by his supervisors to retrieve government property and to seek eviclosed backpack he found directly behind the front seat of the van and discovered drugs,
drug paraphernalia, and cash that were used to prove narcotics charges against the
defendant. Bertine starkly presented the issue of whether the Court's precedent relating to criminal investigations involving searches of automobiles (the Carroll automobile
exception) or the precedent relating to "non-criminal" investigatory activities or intrusions by the government controlled the search of the backpack. In choosing the latter,
the Court cited neither T.L.O. nor Camara. As explained earlier, not utilizing Camara
when assessing inventory procedures the Court itself describes as "administrative"the same label the Court placed on the Camara searches-is difficult to explain.
159. The Court identified "three distinct needs: the protection of the owner's property while it remains in police custody; the protection of the police against claims or
disputes over lost or stolen property; and the protection of the police from potential
danger." South Dakota v. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 369 (1976) (citations omitted).
160. Interestingly, Justice Blackmun wrote separately in Bertine to emphasize the
need to insure police were acting in accordance with standard procedures, but did not
cite T.L.O. or suggest the "special needs" test or rationale was implicated.
161. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987).
162. 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (plurality opinion). Justice Scalia, in his concurring opinion, also accepted the special needs doctrine: "While as a general rule warrantless
searches are per se unreasonable, we have recognized exceptions when 'special needs,
beyond the normal need for law enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause
requirement impracticable. .. .'" O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 732 (1987) (Scalia,
J., concurring).
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dence of workplace misconduct. In Ortega, the plurality applied Justice Blackmun's special needs rubric to excuse the warrant and
probable cause for both "legitimate work-related, non-investigatory intrusions as well as investigations of work-related misconduct." 16 3 Although some language in the plurality's opinion supports the notion
that a law enforcement purpose is relevant in assessing special needs
cases, that language does not support a broad "primary purpose" restriction on suspicionless searches.
In excusing the warrant requirement for the searches, the plurality relied heavily on the fact that, unlike police who conduct searches
"for the primary purpose of obtaining evidence for use in criminal or
other enforcement proceedings, employers most frequently need to
enter the offices and desks of their employees for legitimate work-related reasons wholly unrelated to illegal conduct." 16 4 The plurality
relied on this different nature of employer searches to excuse the warrant requirement because such a requirement "would seriously disrupt the routine conduct of business and would be unduly
burdensome." 1 65 The plurality similarly excused the need for probable cause for non-investigatory work-related searches because "it is
difficult to give the concept of probable cause, rooted as it is in the
criminal investigatory context, much meaning when the purpose of a
search is to retrieve a file for work-related reasons." 166 The plurality
noted that "when employers conduct an investigation, they have an
interest substantially different from the 'normal need for law enforcement."' 16 7 This subtle change in Justice Blackmun's standard, from
when "special needs beyond the normal needs for law enforcement"
were present to "an interest substantially different from the 'normal
need for law enforcement,"' could suggest the "special needs" exception applies to "non-criminal" or non-law enforcement searches rather
than criminal or law enforcement searches in special circumstances.
The plurality added further support for this notion by characterizing
public employers as "not enforcers of the criminal law" 168 and explaining that "while law enforcement officials are expected to 'schoo[1]
163. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 725 (plurality opinion). The Court cited Camara for the
proposition that "In particular, a warrant requirement is not appropriate when 'the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the
search.'" Id. at 720 (plurality opinion). That proposition, of course, says nothing about
the purpose that would be furthered being "non-criminal."
164. Id. at 721 (plurality opinion).
165. Id. at 722 (plurality opinion).
166. Id. at 723 (plurality opinion). Citing the inventory search cases, Colorado v.
Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987) and Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983), the plurality
found the same to be true for a "routine inventory ... for the purpose of securing state
property." Ortega, 480 U.S. at 723 (plurality opinion).
167. Id. at 724 (plurality opinion).
168. Id. (plurality opinion).
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themselves in the niceties of probable cause,' no such expectation is
generally applicable to public employers, at least when the search is
not used to gather evidence of a criminal offense." 16 9 In the end, relying on the fact that the privacy interests in the case were "far less
than those found at home or in some other contexts," 1 70 and that the
intrusions "involve[d] a relatively limited invasion of employee privacy,"1 71 the plurality held that ordinarily a search of an employee's
office by a supervisor requires only "reasonable grounds" for suspecting the search will turn up evidence of misconduct. 17 2 As in
T.L.O., because individualized suspicion was present in the case
before it, the plurality did not decide whether individualized suspicion
was an essential element of the "standard of reasonableness that we
73
adopt today."'
While some language in Ortega focuses on the non-law enforcement purpose in the case before it, the plurality's concerns seem to be
not so much that a law enforcement purpose would be improper, but
that if law enforcement personnel were involved, it would negate the
practical difficulties of requiring probable cause. Several times, the
opinion emphasized that it was the practical realities and burdens
that justified excusing the warrant and probable cause, 17 4 finding
Justice Blackmun's conclusion in T.L.O. that "[a] teacher has neither
the training nor the day-to-day experience in the complexities of probable cause that a law enforcement officer possesses, and is ill equipped
to make a quick judgment about the existence of probable cause" to be
175
an "equally apt description" of public employers and supervisors.
This distinction-drawn both by the plurality and by Justice Blackmun176-was lost in later cases when the Court suggested the involvement of law enforcement indicated an improper purpose, not simply a
169. Id. (plurality opinion) (emphasis added).
170. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion).
171. Id. (plurality opinion).
172. Id. at 726 (plurality opinion).
173. Id. (plurality opinion).
174. "The delay in correcting the employee misconduct caused by the need for probable cause rather than reasonable suspicion will be translated into tangible and often
irreparable damage to the agency's work.... ." Id. at 724 (plurality opinion). "It is simply unrealistic to expect supervisors in most government agencies to learn the subtleties
of the probable cause standard." Id. at 724-25 (plurality opinion).
175. Id. at 725 (plurality opinion).
176. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun quoted his special needs language from his
T.L.O. concurrence to emphasize the point that "[iun sum, only when the practical realities of a particular situation suggest that a government official cannot obtain a warrant
based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to which a search
would contribute, does the Court turn to a 'balancing' test to formulate a standard of
reasonableness for this context." Id. at 741 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (emphasis
added).
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change in the practicality of requiring probable cause. It also ignored
the plurality's reminder early in its opinion that,
[a] s we observed in T.L. 0., "[b] ecause the individual's interest
in privacy and personal security 'suffers whether the government's motivation is to investigate violations of criminal laws
or breaches of other statutory or regulatory standards,'. . . it
would be 'anomalous to say that the individual and his private property are fully protected by the Fourth amendment
only when the individual is suspected of criminal
behavior.' "177
Justice Blackmun's "special needs" doctrine was finally adopted
by a majority of the Court in Griffin v. Wisconsin.17 8 In Griffin, after
stating the rule that a search "usually" requires a warrant and probable cause, the Court stated that it had permitted exceptions to the rule
when "'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable.'"' 179
The Court noted instances in which it had found "special needs"Ortega and T.L.O.-and referred to various administrative searches
as an example where "for similar reasons" the usual rule had been
forgiven.' 8 0 But after referring to administrative searches as similar
but apparently separate from special needs, the Court seemed to bring
them within the special needs category when it concluded, "[a] State's
operation of a probation system, like its operation of a school, government office or prison, or its supervision of a regulated industry, likewise presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may
justify departures from the usual warrant and probable-cause
requirements."' 8 '
After declaring the operation of a probation system a "special
need," the Court emphasized that probation is "a form of criminal
sanction" imposed after conviction of a crime to justify the conclusion
that supervision of probationers "permit[ed] a degree of impingement
upon privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public
at large."' 8 2 The Court then focused on the practical realities of the
needs of the system to find that a warrant requirement and a requirement of probable cause would interfere with and unduly disrupt the
18 3
system, thus permitting the search on reasonable cause.
177. Ortega, 480 U.S. at 715 (plurality opinion) (citations omitted).
178. 483 U.S. 868 (1987).
179. Griffin v. Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987) (quoting New Jersey v. T.L.O.,
469 U.S. 325, 351 (1985)).
180. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873. It is also interesting that the Court did not refer at all
to its inventory cases, including Bertine, which it had decided just six months earlier.
181. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 873-74 (emphasis added).
182. Id. at 874, 875.
183. Id. at 876.
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The importance of a law enforcement purpose is unclear in Griffin. The Court justified forgiving the warrant in part because
"[a]lthough a probation officer is not an impartial magistrate, neither
is he the police officer who normally conducts searches against the
ordinary citizen," 18 4 and also pointed out that the probation officer "is
an employee of the State Department of Health and Social Services
who, while assuredly is charged with protecting the public interest, is
also supposed to have in mind the welfare of the probationer." 18 5 Presumably the Court felt this duty to the "client" would safeguard the
probationer against unjustified or harassing searches.1 8 6 Although
the probation purpose was crucial to the case, it is not clear that probation can be considered a "non-law enforcement" purpose. 187 It is
hard to overlook the close relationship to ordinary law enforcement in
the case.' 8 8 Given the fact that the probation officer was alerted to
the possibility of weapons in Griffin's home by a police officer, that
three police officers accompanied the probation officer to Griffin's
home (but did not participate in the search), and that Griffin was
charged with a criminal offense, at a minimum Griffin runs counter to
the notion that significant involvement of law enforcement tarnishes a
search that otherwise can be justified by a "non-criminal" government
purpose.
Perhaps most interesting, in the case in which his special needs
doctrine was adopted by a majority of the Court,1 8 9 Justice Blackmun
dissented. He agreed that the operation of a probation system represented a special need, but disagreed that the presence of a special
need automatically justified exempting the search from the warrant
and probable cause requirements.' 90 He reemphasized his position in
T.L.O.-the special needs doctrine serves as a gateway to the balancing test, but whether a warrant and probable cause can be excused
depends on the existence of "practical realities of a particular situa184. Id.
185. Id.
186. This was the conclusion Justice Blackmun drew from the Court's statement.
Id. at 886 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
187. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 824 (9th Cir. 2004) (stating that
"[ailmost as soon as the 'special needs' rationale was articulated, however, the Court
applied special needs analysis in what seemed-at least on the surface-to be a clear law
enforcement context."), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
188. See Kincade, 379 F.3d at 825 (stating that "[thus, the Court concluded, the
Constitution permits the execution of probation and parole searches based on no more
than reasonable suspicion-even where the search at issue is triggered by law enforcement information and motivated by apparent law enforcement purposes.").
189. In Ortega, a four justice plurality applied the "special needs" doctrine and Justice Scalia, concurring in the judgment, also applied the special needs doctrine. Ortega,
480 U.S. at 732 (Scalia, J., concurring).
190. Griffin, 483 U.S. at 881 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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tion suggest[ing] that a government official cannot obtain a warrant
based upon probable cause without sacrificing the ultimate goals to
which a search would contribute."' 9 1 While willing to permit the
search on less than probable cause, Justice Blackmun was unwilling
to forgive the warrant requirement. He emphasized the probation
purpose itself could not justify forgoing a warrant. He pointed out
that "[ilf the police themselves had investigated the report of a gun at
petitioner's residence, they would have been required to obtain a warrant."19 2 The fact that the search that took place was a probation
search did not change the result for Justice Blackmun because it
presented no practical obstacles to obtaining a warrant. In addition,
Justice Blackmun focused on the expectation of privacy enjoyed by the
probationer. In his view, unlike administrative cases in which warrants had been forgiven, the search in question involved a home and
therefore the reasoning of the administrative inspection cases "simply
does not extend to the invasion of the special privacy the Court has
recognized for the home."' 9
The fourth case in this group, New York v. Burger,1 94 decided just
two weeks prior to Griffin, suggests a limited role for "criminal purpose" and directly contradicts the idea that excessive entanglement or
involvement of law enforcement officials renders suspicionless
searches invalid. In Burger, the Court upheld the warrantless, suspicionless search of an automobile junkyard pursuant to a state regulatory scheme. The Court initially justified the possible "lessened
application" of the warrant and probable cause requirements of the
Fourth Amendment based on the reduced expectation of privacy enjoyed by the owner of commercial premises in a closely regulated industry. 1 95 In that setting, a warrantless inspection was permissible if
a "substantial government interest" existed, warrantless inspections
were necessary as a practical matter to further the interest, and safeguards existed in place of the warrant to limit the discretion of the
inspecting officers. 1 9 6 After finding the scheme in question met those
requirements, the Court turned to the issue of whether the possible
law enforcement purpose behind the scheme made it
7
impermissible. 19
191. Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
192. Id. at 885. (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "[The probation supervisor] thus had
plenty of time to obtain a search warrant." Id. (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
193. Id. at 884 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
194. 482 U.S. 691 (1987).
195. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 702 (1987).
196. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
197. Id. at 712.
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Despite the state court finding that the scheme had "no truly administrative purpose but was 'designed simply to give the police an
expedient means of enforcing penal sanctions for possession of stolen
property,"'" 9 8 the Court felt the scheme at worst was designed with
mixed or dual motives. The court of appeals' mistake, according to the
Court, was its failure "to recognize that a State can address a major
social problem both by way of an administrative scheme and through
penal sanctions." 199 The Court explained that "administrative statutes and penal laws may have the same ultimate purpose of remedying the social problem, but they have different subsidiary purposes
200
and prescribe different methods of addressing the problem."
The Court declared that "to state that [the statute] is 'really' designed to gather evidence to enable convictions under the penal laws is
to ignore the plain administrative purposes" of the statutory
scheme. 20 1 The Court believed the legislative history demonstrated
that "the New York Legislature had proper regulatory purposes for
enacting the administrative scheme and was not using it as a 'pretext'
to enable law enforcement authorities to gather evidence of penal law
violations." 20 2 In addition, the Court also found no reason to believe
the particular inspection before it was a "pretext" for obtaining evidence of a criminal violation, declaring that it was "undisputed that
the inspection was made solely pursuant to the administrative
scheme." 20 3 The Court failed to see any constitutional significance either in the fact that police officers carried out the search, that in the
course of conducting the administrative inspection the officers discovered evidence of crimes, or that arguably even before the "administrative" search was executed, the government was aware that no further
evidence of an administrative violation would be discovered by a
20 4
search of the junkyard.
The effect of a criminal investigatory purpose is still unclear after
Burger. Burger certainly stands in the way of any assertion that extensive law enforcement involvement necessarily taints a suspicionless search and seizure scheme when the government articulates a
"non-law enforcement" purpose. It also suggests the Court is unlikely
198.

Id.

199. Id.
200. Id. at 712. The Court explained that an administrative scheme establishes
how a business should be operated, setting forth rules to guide the business person's
conduct and allowing government officials to ensure those rules are followed. By contrast, the major emphasis of penal laws is punishment of individuals for specific behavior. Id. at 712-13.
201.
202.
203.
204.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at 715.
at 716 n.27.
(emphasis added).
at 694, 698, 715, 716-17.
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to undertake a careful assessment of the government motive or purpose in mixed motive cases. In Burger, the Court was unwilling to
accept the state court's determination that the search was "intended
solely to uncover evidence of criminality." 20 5 It could be that, like inventory searches, administrative searches are a separate and distinct
category, despite the fact that the Court in Burger characterized the
case as one presenting a "special need."20 6 And if the Court's characterization of the case as a special needs case is dismissed as a mischaracterization early in the development of the special needs
doctrine, that brings us back to characterizing administrative
searches as a separate and distinct category of suspicionless searches,
again casting doubt on the Court's frequent reference to a single category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches. More importantly, it raises the question of why labels such as "administrative
inspection," "traffic checkpoint," and "special needs" should demand
separate analysis. And even if separate analysis is called for, why
should a law enforcement or criminal investigation purpose play a
lesser role (disqualifying the scheme only if it is the sole purpose) in
determining the validity of administrative searches that presumably
depend on their administrative or regulatory character to be valid,
than it plays (disqualifying the scheme if it is the primary purpose) in
cases that depend only on the government demonstrating a "special
law enforcement" need-not a non-law enforcement need?
At this point, if Burger is not a special needs case, the special
needs doctrine had not been utilized to uphold a suspicionless search
or seizure scheme. The question following these cases was whether an
entirely new exception had been created, whether the Court had defined a new type of administrative search, or whether "special needs"
was the new "administrative" search. It seemed that most commentators interpreted the Court as either working within the administrative
search exception or redefining the entire category. 20 7 Categories
aside, it seems fair to characterize the Court's suspicionless search
and seizure jurisprudence at this point as focused less on the government purpose motivating the scheme and more on the expectation of
205. Id. at 698, 712.
206. "Rather, we conclude that, as in other situations of 'special need,' see New
Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 353 (1985) ... a warrantless inspection of commercial
premises may well be reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment." Burger, 482 U.S. at 702.
207. See Schulhofer, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. at 107-10 (discussing the impact of Ortega,
Griffin and Burger on what he variously refers to as the administrative search "doctrine," "rubric," and "category"); Maclin, J.L. MED. & ETHICS, Spring 2005, at 109 ("[A]
majority of the Court soon adopted [the] special needs formula as the controlling standard for measuring the constitutionality of suspicionless searches outside of traditional
law enforcement contexts.").
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privacy compromised by the intrusion, the practical obstacles to obtaining a warrant or probable cause, and the existence of safeguards
to limit the discretion of the individual officers in the field. But the
development of the special needs doctrine had barely begun.
VII.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SPECIAL NEEDS
DOCTRINE AND THE EMERGING IMPORTANCE
OF GOVERNMENT PURPOSE

In the decade following T.L.O., a series of decisions by the Court
in cases challenging suspicionless drug testing of railroad workers,
Customs Department employees, and school children brought the
"special needs" doctrine into prominence and signaled the emergence
of government purpose as an important, if not determinative, factor in
the Court's special needs analysis. In the companion cases of Skinner
v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n 20 8 and National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,20 9 the Court upheld suspicionless drug testing
of railroad workers involved in accidents and Customs Service employees seeking promotions or transfers to jobs directly involving drug
interdiction or requiring the employee to carry a firearm. And in
Vernonia School District47J v. Acton,2 10 the Court upheld urine tests
for students involved in athletics. These cases came to define the "special needs" exception and seemed to suggest that "special needs" now
defined the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible
211
suspicionless searches."
In the drug testing cases, the Court's reliance on a showing of a
"special need" to justify the use of the balancing test suggested it had
found a unifying principle for its suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. In deciding Skinner-the challenge to suspicionless drug
testing of railroad workers-the Court acknowledged that even when
assessing searches by a balancing of interests, generally the warrant
clause governed and required a warrant supported by probable cause.
But the Court then explained that "we have recognized exceptions to
208. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
209. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
210. 515 U.S. 646 (1995).
211. See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 87 (stating Skinner and Von Raab widened the "administrative search exception"); Scott E. Sundby, "Everyman's Fourth
Amendment: Privacy or Mutual Trust Between Government and Citizen?, 94 COLUM. L.
REV. 1751, 1796 (1994) (stating that in deciding to utilize the Warrant Clause or reasonableness approach, the Court has struggled to find the proper fulcrum, but currently
asks whether a special need exists (citing Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab,
489 U.S. 656 (1989))); Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 511 (noting that during this period it
became a familiar Fourth Amendment sight to see courts finding a special need and
resorting to the balancing test); DRESSLER, supra note 22, § 19.01, at nn.7-8 (noting the
'special needs" exception plausibly subsumes administrative search and traffic checkpoint categories).
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this rule, however, 'when "special needs, beyond the normal need for
law enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement
impracticable."' 2 12 Similarly, in the companion case to Skinner, National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, the Court again acknowledged the general rule requiring a warrant and probable cause
(or some other level of individual suspicion), but asserted that its
cases "establish that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement" the Court
may balance the interests de novo to determine whether a warrant or
individual suspicion was required. 2 13 In neither case did the Court
hedge its statement by characterizing special needs as simply one of
2 14
many instances in which the Court had recognized an exception.
And in these cases the Court freely cited to inventory cases, traffic
checkpoint cases, and administrative search cases as if all were within
2 15
the umbrella of the special needs exception.
Similarly, in the public school drug testing case, when explaining
that a warrant and probable cause are "not required to establish the
reasonableness of all government searches," 2 16 the Court again referred to the special needs doctrine seemingly as the route to an exception: "a search unsupported by probable cause can be constitutional,
we have said, 'when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable cause requirement impracticable.'" 2 17 And in explaining that even individualized suspicion
was not necessarily required in these cases, the Court referred to
Skinner and Von Raab, as well as its cases permitting traffic checkpoints "looking for illegal immigrants and contraband" and drunk
drivers, as if all were in the same category of searches. Thus, it
seemed justified to conclude that the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches and seizures" to which
the Court frequently had referred was, in fact, the "special needs" ex-

212. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 619 (1989).
213. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665 (1989).
214. See Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d 659, 662 (7th Cir. 1999) (stating "the Supreme Court has insisted that 'to be reasonable under the Fourth Amendment a search
must be based on individualized suspicion of wrongdoing,' save in cases of'special need'
based on 'concerns other than crime detection'"), af/d sub nom. City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32 (2000).
215. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619-20 ('The government's interest in regulating the
conduct of railroad employees to insure safety, like its supervision of probationers and
regulated industries, or its operation of a government office, school or prison 'likewise
presents 'special needs' beyond normal law enforcement that may justify departures
from the usual warrant and probable cause requirements.'").
216. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995).
217. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
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ception. 2 18 If that were the case, however, it would make the introduction of a "non-law enforcement purpose" test problematic because,
as discussed earlier, many of the earlier suspicionless search and
seizure cases had not drawn such a distinction. But in the new "special needs" cases, the Court seemed to be imposing such a test.
In the drug testing cases, the Court seemed to rely more explicitly
than in previous cases on the non-criminal nature of the schemes
before it to justify freeing itself from the requirement of a warrant and
individual suspicion. 2 19 As discussed previously, in the early cases,
the non-criminal nature of the searches was relevant as a factor to be
balanced-the fact that school officials and employers less familiar
with the intricacies of probable cause were carrying out the search
meant the warrant requirement was less practical-but did not serve
as a prerequisite to the scheme qualifying to be assessed under the
balancing test. In the drug testing cases, particularly Skinner, the
Court more explicitly stated that the general rule requiring a warrant
and probable cause applied in "most criminal cases" 220 or "where a
search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence
of criminal wrongdoing." 2 2 1 More importantly, the Court seemed to
use the non-criminal purpose as a prerequisite to the balancing test or
the special needs exception, rather than simply as a factor to be
2 22
weighed in the balance in determining if a warrant was practical.
The Court did not explain-or even acknowledge-this new emphasis
2 23
on the non-criminal nature of the search.
Several times in his opinion for the Court in Skinner, Justice Kennedy alluded to the "non-criminal enforcement" purpose of the
218. See also Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 77, 84 (2001) (referring
first to the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches" and later to the "closely guarded category of special needs").
219. Chirstopher Mebane, Rediscovering the Foundationof the Special Needs Exception to the FourthAmendment in Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 40 Hous. L. REV. 177,
205-06 (2003) (noting the Court's previous caveats against using samples obtained in
criminal prosecution were made explicit in Skinner).
220. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619.
221. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
222. See Dodson, 51 S.C. L. REV. at 275 ("The bulk of the Court's opinion in both Von
Raab and Skinner is devoted to justifying the special needs exception and showing that
a special need existed thus triggering the balancing approach." In Skinner, Justice
Kennedy justified the government's interest in regulating the conduct of railroad employees as a special need in part by emphasizing that the agency "has prescribed toxicological tests not to assist in the prosecution of the employees, but rather 'to prevent
accidents and casualties that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or
drugs.'").
223. See Ronald F. Wright, The Civil and Criminal Methodologies of the Fourth
Amendment, 93 YALE L.J. 1127, 1128 (1984) (noting that quite by chance the boundary
line between civil and criminal cases has formed the dividing line between balancing
and probable cause methodology as distinct ways of defining unreasonable searches and
seizures).
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scheme. That purpose seemed to play two different roles in the decision. One was the same "non-criminal" purpose played in previous
cases-as a factor in the balancing undertaken by the Court. It meant
that because the supervisors were "not in the business of investigating
violations of the criminal laws," as a practical matter they were less
familiar with the intricacies of the Fourth Amendment, thereby justifying the Court in excusing the warrant (and perhaps the probable
cause) requirement when it applied the balancing test. 2 24 But the
Court in Skinner also suggested another role for government purpose.
Earlier in his opinion, in justifying the government's interest as a special need, Justice Kennedy emphasized that the agency "has prescribed toxicological tests not to assist in the prosecution of the
employees, but rather 'to prevent accidents and casualties in railroad
operations that result from impairment of employees by alcohol or
drugs.'" 2 25 That statement in the course of determining whether the
government interest qualified as a "special need" suggests a law enforcement purpose could preclude a scheme from qualifying within the
"closely guarded category of permissible suspicionless searches." 22 6 In
a footnote, Justice Kennedy elaborated. He conceded that the regulation could be read to authorize release of the samples to law enforcement authorities, but declared that the record "does not disclose that
it was intended to be, or actually has been, so read."2 2 7 He went on to
state that although the plaintiffs "aver generally that test results
might be made available to law enforcement authorities, ... they do
not seriously contend that . .. the administrative scheme was designed as a 'pretext' to enable law enforcement authorities to gather
evidence of penal law violations."' 2 28 Justice Kennedy declared that
absent a "persuasive showing" that the testing program was pretextual, the court would assess the scheme "in light of its obvious administrative purpose." 22 9 He expressly left for another day the question
whether routine use in criminal prosecutions of evidence obtained
pursuant to the administrative scheme would give rise to an inference
of pretext ....-230
Although the Court left the question for another day, the possibility that the question may be a relevant one elevates the role of government purpose and seems to open the door to a pretext argument by
224. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 623-24.
225. Id. at 620-21.
226. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77; see also Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 309 (1997).
227. Id. at 621 n.5.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. The Court's framing the issue in terms of an administrative scheme further
supports the notion that the Court viewed the "special needs" doctrine as encompassing
at least that category of suspicionless search.
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individuals challenging suspicionless search and seizure schemes.
The Court's citation to New York v. Burger, however, suggests it was
unlikely the Court would strike down an administrative scheme on
such a basis. In Burger, the Court rejected the state court's characterization of the scheme as one designed solely for criminal purposes and
chastised the state court for failing "to recognize that a state can address a major social problem both by way of an administrative scheme
and through penal sanctions."23 1 That suggests that, a least for
"mixed motive" or "dual motive" schemes, the pretext argument was
23 2
unlikely to prevail.
In the end, the decision in Skinner turned on the factors identified
earlier-the limited discretion exercised by the railroad supervisors in
charge of the drug tests and the diminished expectation of privacy of
employees in a highly regulated industry-but also on "surpassing
safety interests served by the toxicological tests,"23 3 setting the stage
for government purpose to emerge as a controlling factor in the
Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. Justice Marshall, in his dissent, recognized this shift. He feared that once the
Court drew the line based on government purpose, it would be too
easy to uphold schemes with a non-criminal purpose. 23 4 He argued
that the majority had "complet[ed] the process begun in T.L.O. of eliminating altogether the probable cause requirement for civil searchesthose undertaken for reasons 'beyond the normal need for law enforcement.'" 2 3 5 He made the point that "the Fourth Amendment-unlike
the Fifth and Sixth-does not confine its protection to either criminal
or civil actions. Instead, it protects generally '[tihe right of the people
to be secure."' 2 36 He noted the irony of the fact that this principlethat the Fourth Amendment applies equally to criminal and civil
searches-was emphasized in the Court's holding in T.L.O., the genesis of the special needs doctrine. 23 7 Justice Marshall expressed con231. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 692 (1987).
232. Justice Kennedy's statement is eerily reminiscent of statements made in cases
prior to Whren that led commentators to suggest that a showing of pretext would result
in searches based on probable cause being struck down by the Court-only to be sorely
disappointed. See infra at notes 342-46 and accompanying text.
233. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634.
234. This fear seems to be validated by Justice O'Connor in Vernonia where she
emphasized the need for careful scrutiny of suspicionless schemes outside the criminal
context and expressed concern that the Court had failed to apply such scrutiny in the
case before it. Acton, 515 U.S. at 672-79. See also Dodson, 51 S.C. L. REV. at 275 (stating the fact that the Court has never invalidated a law using the special needs balancing test suggests that if"non-criminal" is the path to balancing, there will be few, if any,
limits on such searches).
235. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
236. Id. at 641 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 641 n.5 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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cern over the "manipulable balancing inquiry" which the Court
utilized upon the "mere assertion of a 'special need'" to uphold significant intrusions on individuals' privacy.2 38 He argued that regardless
of the purpose behind the scheme, the requirement of probable cause
should only be excused when the "government action in question had a
'substantially less intrusive' impact on privacy," thereby clearly falling
23 9
short of a full-scale search.
In addition to his concern that schemes with a "non-criminal" purpose would be too easily upheld, Justice Marshall revealed skepticism
that even searches with a criminal purpose would be found impermissible when he criticized the majority's failure to be clear about the
impact of the possibility that the samples in Skinner could be utilized
to generate criminal prosecutions. He asserted that if the majority
believed the prospect of criminal prosecution did not change the balance, it should say so. He accused the majority of a grave disservice to
Fourth Amendment values by "ducking this important issue." Although he took solace from the fact that the majority had preserved
for another day the possibility of a pretext defense, he characterized
240
the majority as "belittling" the defense.
In Von Raab, Justice Kennedy similarly relied on the non-criminal purposes of the testing program for two distinct purposes: first, to
justify utilizing the balancing test and, second, to justify forgiving the
requirement of probable cause when applying the balancing test. After reiterating the familiar standard that "a search must be supported, as a general matter, by a warrant issued upon probable cause,"
Justice Kennedy explained that previous cases "establish that where a
Fourth Amendment intrusion serves special governmental needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement," the balancing test is appropriate. 24 1 He then immediately declared that "it is clear that the
Customs Service drug testing program is not designed to serve the
ordinary needs of law enforcement," 24 2 supporting that statement by
relying, at least in part, on the fact the test results could not be used
in a criminal prosecution. 243 Later, in the course of applying the balancing test, he justified excusing probable cause by citing the inventory search cases for the proposition that, "Our cases teach, however,
that the probable-cause standard 'is peculiarly related to criminal in238. Id. at 640 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
239. Id. at 637-38 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (citing Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S.
200, 210 (1979)).
240. Id. at 650-52, 652 n.10 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
241. Nat'l Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 665-66 (1989).
242. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666.
243. Id.
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vestigations.'" 2 44 He further explained this was particularly true
"where the Government seeks to prevent the development of hazardous conditions or to detect violations that rarely generate articulable
grounds for searching any particular place or person." 24 5 For that
proposition, Justice Kennedy cited Camara and Martinez-Fuerte, a
traffic checkpoint case. 2 46 Again the Court relied on cases across the
spectrum of its suspicionless search cases, suggesting the Court either
viewed the special needs doctrine as a unifying thread or was unifying
its suspicionless search jurisprudence under the special needs doctrine in these cases. And while the non-criminal purpose seemed to
have been elevated in importance, particularly as a threshold requirement to the balancing test, the bulk of the Court's analysis focused on
the governmental interest at stake and the diminished expectation of
privacy enjoyed by the group subject to the testing scheme.
Non-criminal purpose played an even smaller role in the school
drug testing case. Justice Scalia justified utilizing the balancing test
to determine "reasonableness" because "there was no clear practice,
either approving or disapproving the type of search at issue, at the
time the constitutional provision was enacted." 24 7 He acknowledged
that "where a search is undertaken by law enforcement officials to discover evidence of criminal wrongdoing," reasonableness generally required a warrant, but again explained that a warrant and probable
248
cause could be excused when special needs justified the scheme.
Because the Court had previously found "such 'special needs' to exist
in the public school context" and to forgive a warrant and probable
cause, the Court quickly dispensed with those requirements and
turned its attention to applying the balancing test to determine
24 9
whether individual suspicion was required to justify the search.
On that issue, the Court focused very little on the non-criminal purpose of the scheme. The Court discussed what it described as the
"first factor"-the expectation of privacy-at great length. 2 50 The fact
that the test results were not turned over to law enforcement played a
25 1
minor role in the second factor-the character of the intrusion.
When the Court turned to "the nature and immediacy of the govern244. Id. at 667-68 (quoting Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371 (1987)). Justice
Kennedy's reliance on the inventory search cases, to this point treated as a separate
category of suspicionless searches, was another indication that the Court may have
been unifying its suspicionless search jurisprudence under the special needs doctrine.
245. Id. at 668.
246. Id.
247. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 652 (1995).
248. Acton, 515 U.S. at 653.
249. Id.
250. Id. at 654-58.
251. Id. at 658.
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mental concern at issue here," it focused on the extent of the drug
problem the government was attempting to combat, not the criminal
or non-criminal character of the intrusion. 25 2 At the conclusion of the
opinion, however, the Court did "caution against the assumption that
suspicionless drug testing will readily pass constitutional muster in
other contexts." 2 53 The Court explained that the most significant factor in the present case and the cases involving drug testing of government employees was the responsibilities the government undertook as
a guardian and tutor in the school setting and as an employer. 25 4 Although the Court did not emphasize or characterize these responsibilities as "non-criminal," its "caution" certainly suggests the government
as criminal law enforcer might be given less latitude.
In any case, the indications that criminal purpose did or would
play an important role in the Court's suspicionless search and seizure
jurisprudence, which the Court seemed to be unifying under the special needs doctrine, were fairly strong after the drug testing cases. At
a minimum, the stage seemed set for the Court to clarify the role it
saw for the purpose motivating the scheme. But not every signal the
Court sent pointed in that direction.
In the midst of deciding the drug testing cases, the Court revisited
traffic checkpoints in Michigan Department of State Police v. Sitz, 2 5 5 a
civil case challenging a highway sobriety checkpoint program instituted by the Michigan State Police. The lower court 25 6 had invalidated the program utilizing a balancing test derived from an earlier
United States Supreme Court case, Brown v. Texas.2 5 7 Although they
had prevailed below, the plaintiffs argued the balancing test was not
the proper method of analysis to decide the case. The plaintiffs relied
on Von Raab to argue that unless the government demonstrated a special need "'beyond the normal need' for criminal law enforcement,"
probable cause or reasonable suspicion was required and a balancing
analysis was inappropriate. 2 58 Rather than finding or even sug252. Id. at 661-64.
253. Id. at 665.
254. Id.
255. 496 U.S. 444 (1990).
256. The case came to the Court from the Michigan Court of Appeals, the Michigan
Supreme Court having declined review. Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 448 (1990).
257. 443 U.S. 47 (1979).
258. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449. This is a confusing assertion in that utilizing reasonable
suspicion itself required resort to a balancing test to forgive a warrant and probable
cause. In fact, in Brown v.Texas, 443 U.S. 47 (1979), the Court utilized the balancing
test as it had in Terry to require reasonable suspicion for the stop at issue, which the
state justified on individual suspicion, not a suspicionless scheme. Brown, 443 U.S. at
51.
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gesting that such a special need was present, Justice Rehnquist provided a curt and cryptic response to the argument:
But it is perfectly plain from a reading of Von Raab, which
cited and discussed with approval our earlier decision in
United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, that it was in no way designed to repudiate our prior cases dealing with police stops
of motorists on public highways. Martinez-Fuerte,which utilized a balancing analysis in approving highway checkpoints
for detecting illegal aliens,
and Brown v. Texas are the rele25 9
vant authority here.
He went on to find the sobriety checkpoint satisfied the balancing test
and was constitutional.
The meaning of Justice Rehnquist's response is unclear. He may
have intended to convey that because Von Raab cited and discussed
Martinez-Fuerte with approval, the Von Raab Court believed traffic
checkpoints represented a special need. That seems unlikely because,
unlike the public school context, it is the reason behind the checkpoint, not the "setting" of a checkpoint, which would constitute the
special need. Even if immigration control represented a special need
in the Von Raab Court's view, the question of whether sobriety checkpoints likewise did would be an issue. It seems more likely that Justice Rehnquist was ruling the special needs doctrine irrelevant in
traffic checkpoint cases. Nevertheless, many courts and commentators continue to refer to Sitz as a special needs case. 2 60 If that is accurate, Sitz stands in the way of any assertion that significant law
enforcement involvement in a suspicionless search or seizure scheme
taints the validity of such a scheme under the special needs doctrine.
The Sitz checkpoint was a law enforcement operation from beginning
to end, designed and executed by the State Police. In his balancing
analysis, Justice Rehnquist never suggested the extensive law enforcement involvement or the resulting criminal prosecution compromised the scheme. In fact, the "effectiveness" of the scheme in terms
of arrests made was used to bolster the state side of the balancing
scale.
More likely than asserting traffic checkpoints constitute a special
need, Justice Rehnquist was treating traffic checkpoints as a separate
category of permissible suspicionless seizures. If that is so, the
Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence is further fractured among categories rather than unified under special needs, and
government purpose plays a different role among the categories. That
259. Sitz, 496 U.S. at 449.
260. See MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 268 (2d Cir. 2006) (citing both Sitz and
Martinez-Fuerteas cases applying the special needs exception); Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at
520 (discussing Sitz as a special needs case).
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made the next development in the Court's suspicionless search and
seizure jurisprudence all the more confusing-the Court chose a traffic checkpoint case to elevate a government purpose to control crime to
a disqualifying factor for suspicionless search and seizure schemes.
VIII.

A NEW LIMIT ON SUSPICIONLESS SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES: THE PRIMARY PURPOSE TEST

The relevance of a "criminal" or "law enforcement" purpose motivating a government suspicionless search or seizure scheme moved to
the forefront of the Court's jurisprudence in City of Indianapolis v.
Edmond.26 1 As briefly discussed earlier, in Edmond the Court de261. The first case in which the Court struck down a government scheme of suspicionless searches was Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997). Chandler involved a
challenge to a Georgia statute that required candidates for designated state offices to
certify that they had tested negative for illegal drugs through a urinalysis drug test
within thirty days prior to qualifying for nomination or election. The Court's decision
had nothing to do with an improper "criminal" purpose. The defect in Georgia's proffered justification for the scheme-that the use of illegal drugs draws into question an
official's judgment and integrity, jeopardizes the discharge of public functions, including
antidrug law enforcement efforts, and undermines public confidence and trust in elected
officials-was that nothing in the record suggested that these hazards were "real and
not simply hypothetical for Georgia's polity." Chandler, 520 U.S. at 319. The Court
emphasized that the statute was not enacted in response to any fear or suspicion of drug
use by state officials and explained that a demonstrated problem of drug abuse would
shore up the validity of a testing regime. Id. Although Chandleradds little to the issue
of a "non-criminal" governmental purpose, it nevertheless offers insights into the
Court's search and seizure jurisprudence.
Justice Ginsberg's introduction to her opinion demonstrates an attempt to describe
a unified suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. After explaining that the
Fourth Amendment "generally bars officials from undertaking a search or seizure absent individualized suspicion," she acknowledged that searches conducted without individualized suspicion had been upheld "in certain limited circumstances." Id. at 308. She
cited the full spectrum of suspicionless cases the Court had upheld-drug testing of
workers, immigration and sobriety checkpoints, and "administrative inspections in
closely regulated businesses"-before explaining the Court was striking down the Georgia scheme because it "does not fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." Id. at 308-09. Although she did not initially
label this "closely guarded category" as "special needs," later in her opinion, as she began her analysis of the issues, she reiterated that "particularized exceptions to the main
rule [of individualized suspicion] are sometimes warranted based on special needs beyond the normal need for law enforcement." Id. at 313-14. Either the special needs
exception defines the closely guarded category and drug testing, certain traffic checkpoints and administrative searches are "limited circumstances" within that category, or
the category is unnamed and includes special needs as one of the limited circumstances.
If the latter is the case, it is curious that Justice Ginsberg did not list special needs
when she originally delineated the types of searches included in the "limited circumstances." And in analyzing the drug testing scheme before the Court, Justice Ginsberg
relied exclusively on the special needs exception. Because the Court was striking down
the scheme, if another, separate "circumstance" existed under which the scheme could
pass muster, the Court should have considered that possibility. The Court's description
of a single category and its focus exclusively on special needs supports the notion of a
unified search and seizure jurisprudence centered on "special needs." Chief Justice
Rehnquist noted this attempt at a unifying theme in his dissent: "Today's opinion
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clared unconstitutional a program of vehicle checkpoints operated in
Indianapolis in an effort to interdict unlawful drugs. 26 2 Justice
O'Connor, writing for the Court, immediately focused attention on the
purpose of the checkpoint program. In the second sentence of the
opinion, she explained, "[wie now consider the constitutionality of a
highway checkpoint program whose primary purpose is the discovery
and interdiction of illegal narcotics." 2 63 After describing the checkpoint program at issue, Justice O'Conner began her analysis by focusing not on whether a balancing test was appropriate, but directly on
the issue of individualized suspicion. She reiterated the rule that "a
search or seizure is ordinarily unreasonable in the absence of individualized suspicion of wrongdoing." 2 6 4 But rather than referring to a
single "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches" as the Court had done previously, Justice O'Connor
explained the court had recognized exceptions "only in limited circumstances," giving as examples "certain regimes of suspicionless
searches where the program was designed to serve 'special needs, beyond the normal need for law enforcement;'" appropriately limited
searches for "certain administrative purposes;" and brief, suspispeaks of a 'closely guarded' class of permissible suspicionless searches [and seizures]
which must be justified by a 'special need.'" Chandler,520 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, C.J.,
dissenting).
Chandleralso provides some insight into how the Court might treat "dual purpose"
schemes in this "closely guarded category." Although the Court found the purposes articulated by Georgia not sufficiently substantial to qualify as a "special need" and justify
the drug testing scheme, as a final note in her opinion Justice Ginsberg emphasized
that "Georgia's singular drug test for candidates is not part of a medical examination
designed to provide certification of a candidate's general health, and we express no opinion on such examinations." Chandler, 520 U.S. at 323. That suggests that a "dual motive" scheme created by the Georgia legislature-a medical exam designed to provide
certification of a candidate's health that included a drug test-might allow Georgia to
accomplish its purpose. Chief Justice Rehnquist noticed this as well. He expressed disbelief that the result could conceivably be different because the intrusion would be identical, and he did not believe the Court should distinguish based on the purpose behind
the scheme. Chandler,520 U.S. at 327-28 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
262. The case came to the Court on stipulated facts concerning the operation of the
checkpoints. The checkpoints were staffed by approximately thirty police officers and
operated pursuant to written directives issued by the chief of police. The officers
stopped a predetermined number of vehicles, and at least one officer approached the
vehicle and advised the driver that he or she was being stopped briefly at a drug checkpoint. The officer asked the driver to produce a license and registration. While doing
so, the officer looked for signs of impairment and conducted an "open view" examination
of the vehicle while a narcotics-detection dog walked around the outside of the stopped
vehicle. The officers had no discretion to stop any vehicle out of sequence, and were
instructed that they could only conduct a search if they obtained consent or developed
the appropriate quantum of particularized suspicion. The operation of the checkpoint
was designed to limit the total duration of the stop, absent particularized suspicion, to
five minutes. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 35-36 (2000).
263. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 34.
264. Id. at 37.
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cionless seizures of motorists at fixed Border Patrol checkpoints and
at sobriety checkpoints. 26 5 After noting that the Court also had "suggested" that a checkpoint established to verify drivers' licenses and
registrations would be permissible, Justice O'Connor quickly noted,
"In none of these cases, however, did we indicate approval of a checkpoint program whose primary purpose was to detect evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing." 26 6 True enough, but neither had the
Court ever indicated such checkpoints were impermissible. The Court
had described the purpose of the checkpoint programs it had upheld as
for "law enforcement" purposes, if not "to detect evidence of ordinary
criminal wrongdoing," and further, at least in Sitz, the checkpoint program the Court upheld had in fact detected "evidence of ordinary crim26 7
inal wrongdoing"-driving under the influence.
Nevertheless, after describing the checkpoints the Court previously upheld as "designed primarily to serve purposes closely related
to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring
roadway safety," the Court held that "[blecause the primary purpose
of the Indianapolis narcotics checkpoint program is to uncover evidence of ordinary criminal wrongdoing, the program contravenes the
268
Fourth Amendment."
Despite this emphatic holding, the Court had difficulty explicating the distinction it was attempting to make. In response to the
State's argument that the checkpoints upheld by the Court in the earlier cases had the same ultimate purpose of arresting those suspected
265. Id.
266. Id. at 38.
267. Before addressing the particular checkpoint at issue in the case, Justice
O'Connor went to great lengths to identify the particular contexts in which it upheld
previous checkpoints. She described Martinez-Fuerte as one of a number of Fourth
Amendment cases reflecting longstanding concern for the protection of the border, but
also noted the importance in that case of the "formidable law enforcement problems"
posed by the flow of illegal entrants into the United States. She also pointed out that
the checkpoint program in Sitz "was clearly aimed at reducing the immediate hazard
posed by the presence of drunk drivers on the highways," explaining "there was an obvious connection between the imperative of highway safety and the law enforcement practice at issue." Id. at 39. Finally, Justice O'Connor noted that although the Court had
invalidated a discretionary, suspicionless stop for a spot check of a motorist's driver's
license and vehicle registration in Delaware v.Prouse, it had suggested in that case that
a traffic checkpoint for the same purpose would be lawful. She asserted that the Court
in Prouse had considered "the purposes of such a hypothetical roadblock to be distinct
from a general purpose of investigating crime," stating that "Prouseitself reveals a difference in the Fourth Amendment significance of highway safety interest and the general interest in crime control." Id. at 39-40. While this may be true, it is not clear that
the Prouse majority viewed the general interest in crime control as an improper purpose
that precluded the balancing test altogether. Rather, as discussed earlier, the Court in
Prouse seemed simply to suggest that such an interest added little to the government
side of the ledger when undertaking the balancing test. See supra notes 102-06 and
accompanying text.
268. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
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of committing crimes, the Court acknowledged that "[s]ecuring the
border and apprehending drunk drivers are, of course, law enforcement activities, and law enforcement officers employ arrests and criminal prosecutions in pursuit of these goals," but went on to state, "[i]f
we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be
little check on the ability of authorities to construct roadblocks for al2 69
most any conceivable law enforcement purpose."
If the Court is concerned with the primary purpose rather than
the ultimate purpose, it seems to have the two confused. The ultimate
purpose of the program in Sitz was to increase highway safety; the
government sought to accomplish this through criminal sanctionsusing arrests and the threat of arrest and criminal sanctions to keep
impaired drivers off the road-and the "primary purpose" of the
checkpoint was to generate evidence and to make those arrests. Similarly, the ultimate purpose of the program in Martinez-Fuertewas to
stem the flow of illegal immigration. Again, the government sought to
accomplish this through criminal sanctions-using arrests and the
threat of arrests to deter individuals from smuggling illegal immigrants across the border-and the primary purpose of the checkpoint
was to generate evidence and make those arrests. 2 70 Thus, although
the Court expressly eschews reliance on the ultimate purpose, it
seemed to do just that. If it had focused on the primary purpose, it
would have recognized that all three programs had the same purpose:
attempting to generate evidence to make arrests in order to serve the
ultimate purpose of battling a larger societal problem-highway
safety, border security, or the drug epidemic.
The Court's statement could be read as identifying immigration
control and highway safety as "special needs beyond the normal needs
of law enforcement," thus distinguishing among "law enforcement
purposes" rather than having its decisions turn on the presence of any
27 1
purpose that could generally be described as "law enforcement."
The Court repeatedly distinguished the Indianapolis program as
aimed at detecting ordinary criminal wrongdoing. Presumably the
Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte programs were different because they were
aimed at special wrongdoing or special governmental needs. But in
Sitz the Court had rejected characterizing traffic checkpoint cases as
269. Id. at 42.
270. In Burger,the auto scrap yard inspection case, the Court characterized the ultimate purpose as combating auto theft, not carrying out inspections. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 693 (1987).
271. The Court later characterized its language in Edmond in just this manner. See
Illinois v. Lidster, 540 U.S. 419, 424 (2004) (emphasizing that the Court in Edmond
specified that the "general interest in crime control" with which it was concerned did not
refer to every "law enforcement" objective and citing Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte as addressing "special law enforcement concerns").
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"special needs" cases, and at the beginning of her opinion in Edmond,
Justice O'Connor had placed traffic checkpoint cases in a separate
"limited circumstance" of permissible suspicionless search and
seizure. Importing a "non-law enforcement primary purpose test"
from the "special needs" cases-which Chief Justice Rehnquist in his
dissent 2 7 2 accused the Court of doing-would be problematic. While a
plausible argument could be made that "special needs" as previously
used by the Court referred to a "non-law enforcement" purpose or at
least precluded significant involvement of law enforcement in the
scheme or use of the evidence obtained, 2 73 that same argument is difficult to make in the traffic checkpoint cases. They all involved extensive law enforcement personnel and a basic law enforcement purpose:
to arrest individuals for criminal offenses. Such arrests were a goal of
the programs and a measure of their effectiveness. 2 74 Justice
O'Connor's careful parsing of the Court's previous statements relating
to the purposes of various search and seizure schemes to distinguish
between "law enforcement purposes" and "the general interest in
crime control" is a dramatic change from the "terminological inexactitude" that had characterized the Court's previous opinions. Even if
the Court's new precision could be defended as consistent with those
previous cases, the Court offered no explanation why this should serve
as the dividing line between permissible and impermissible suspicionless search and seizure schemes. The Court stated that "without
drawing the line at roadblocks designed primarily to serve the general
interest in crime control, the Fourth Amendment would do little to
prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
life." 27 5 But how does drawing such a line limit roadblocks, especially
when the government apparently can set up all the roadblocks it
wants to check licenses and registrations? 2 76 Perhaps, the Court
thinks license and registration checks will not be sufficiently attrac272. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53-54 (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist identified the source of this test as "a distinct area of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence relating to the searches of homes and businesses," which he then identified as the
"special needs doctrine." Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
273. See supra notes 219-55 and accompanying text.
274. See United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543, 554 (1976) (discussing effectiveness of program in terms of arrests); Mich. Dep't of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S.
444, 454-55 (1990) (same).
275. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
276. See United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (in two-month
period, seventy-seven roadblocks were established in one police district in the District of
Columbia as part of "Operation Cleansweep" to "control the traffic congestion that resulted from street drug sales"; court upholds searches as having "main purpose" of allowing police to regulate vehicular traffic by checking drivers' licenses and vehicle
registrations; police acknowledged they were hopeful of "halo" effect of deterring drug
trafficking).
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tive to law enforcement to motivate frequent checkpoints. 2 77 Relying
on the possibility that government officials will be dissuaded by practical difficulties or resource limitations seems an abdication of the
Court's responsibility to protect Fourth Amendment rights, but even
that protection depends, in part, on how carefully the Court will police
for improper motives in establishing the checkpoints. If law enforcement agencies can set up license and registration checkpoints in the
hope of also catching some drug traffickers-the classic "mixed motive" situation-the Court's new limit will not have changed the
calculus on whether checkpoints are worth the effort. The Court's
track record of dealing with pretext in other contexts suggests rigorous policing for pretext is unlikely.
In Edmond, the state argued that "prior cases preclude an inquiry
into the purposes of the checkpoint program." 278 The state was relying on the Court's decisions in Whren and Bond, in which the Court
held that prior cases "foreclose any argument that the constitutional
reasonableness of traffic stops depends on the actual motivations of
the individual officers involved."2 79 To justify imposing a purpose
test, Justice O'Connor pointed out that in Whren the Court had expressly distinguished "cases where we had addressed the validity of
searches conducted in the absence of probable cause," and cited the
cases Whren had distinguished: two inventory cases and New York v.
Burger, the auto junkyard inspection case. 280 Justice O'Connor made
the point that in those cases the Court had warned against the state
utilizing such searches as a pretext to hide a "purely investigative purpose" or as a "pretext for gathering evidence of violations of the penal
laws." 28 ' The Court concluded, "Whren therefore reinforces the principle that, while 'subjective intentions play no role in ordinary, probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis,' programmatic purposes may
be relevant to the validity of Fourth Amendment intrusions undertaken pursuant to a general scheme without individualized suspicion.
Accordingly, Whren does not preclude an inquiry into programmatic
28 2
purpose in such contexts."
While the Court may be correct to distinguish Whren pretext issues from an inquiry into the programmatic purpose of a suspicionless
277. See Lidster, 540 U.S. at 426 (concluding an "Edmond-type rule" unnecessary to
prevent an unreasonable proliferation of police checkpoints of the type in question because "[p]ractical considerations [ofl limited police resources and community hostility to
traffic tieups seem likely to inhibit any such proliferation. .
278. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45.
279. Id.
280. Id.
281. Id. (citing Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 372 (1987) and New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17 n.27 (1987)).
282. Id. at 45-46.
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search scheme 28 3-which I will label "institutional pretext"-such an
inquiry into programmatic purposes raises additional problems. Foremost, if the Court is willing to undertake such an inquiry into improper purpose and expects lower courts to do so, a clear definition of
the improper purpose is imperative. Although the Court apparently
believes its new distinction between a "law enforcement purpose" and
a purpose "to advance the general interest in crime control" is clear,
lower courts may be as confused as Chief Justice Rehnquist claimed to
be. 28 4 More importantly, once the improper purpose is defined, when
does such an improper purpose invalidate a scheme? The Court explained that "our special needs and administrative search cases
demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme are at issue."2 8 5 But those cases
suggest very little scrutiny of the government purpose motivating the
scheme. In inventory cases, the Court will only strike down a search
as improper if it finds bad faith or that the sole purpose of the search
was investigatory. 28 6 Similarly, in New York v. Burger, identified by
Whren and Edmond as a case supporting an inquiry into "institutional
pretext," the Court seemed to impose a similar "sole purpose" test.
The Court chastised the lower court for not recognizing that a proper
28 7
scheme could have dual motives.
The Court in Edmond likely cited the inventory cases and Burger
simply to support the notion that an inquiry into programmatic purpose is appropriate, not as examples of the level of inquiry or the
proper test for institutional pretext. The Court nominally imposed a
primary purpose test, not a sole purpose test. The Court ruled that
the secondary purposes advanced by the state of keeping impaired motorists, off the road and verifying licenses could not save the scheme,
which they presumably would under a "sole purpose" pretext test. If it
permitted the secondary purposes to legitimize the checkpoint, the
Court feared law enforcement authorities would be able "to establish
checkpoints for virtually any purpose so long as they also included a
283. This could be termed a concern for "institutional pretext" versus the individual
subjective motivation pretext with which the Court dealt in Whren.
284. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) (referring to
Edmond and Ferguson and concluding "the Court's more recent 'special needs' cases
have emphasized the absence of any law enforcement motive underlying the challenged
search and seizure" (emphasis added)), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
And in the Court's very next suspicionless search case, Justice Stevens, writing for the
majority, used the terms interchangeably. See infra notes 300-10 and accompanying
text.
285. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47.
286. Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367, 371, 372 (1987).
287. New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 712-13 (1987). Professor Sundby recognizes
this tension between the inquiry called for in the latest cases imposing a primary purpose test and the earlier cases. See Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 532.
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license or sobriety check." 28 8 That is precisely what was argued in the
Whren-type pretext cases-that officers could stop anyone for any purpose so long as they included a routine traffic violation-and also in
the "institutional pretext" cases to which the Court purported to look
for authority. But in those cases, despite the potentially improper motive, the fact that the objective intrusion was no greater than could be
accomplished legally with a proper purpose convinced the Court to uphold the intrusions. In Edmond, the Court seems concerned not just
with the objective intrusion, but with the motivation behind the intrusion and how often citizens are subjected to it. 2 8 9 But in a footnote,
the Court refused to rule out the possibility that it would be permissible for police to "expand the scope of a license or sobriety checkpoint
2 90
If
seizure in order to detect the presence of drugs in a stopped car."
the Court is willing to permit that, the "primary purpose" test becomes, in effect, a "sole purpose" test, and the "institutional pretext"
inquiry will be no more effective than the traditional pretext inquiry
in cases like Whren. 29 1 It suggests the only mistake the City of Indianapolis officials made was being blatant about their desire to catch
288. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46.
289. Id. at 47.
290. Id. at 47 n.2.
291. See United States v. Faulkner, 450 F.3d 466 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding U.S.
Park Service "informational checkpoint" set up partly in response to complaints about
intoxicated motorists, increased litter, illegal fires, underage consumption of alcohol
and controlled substances, and gang activity and finding primary purpose was to provide information to visitors to the recreation area of the regulations governing its use,
which include but are not limited to the possession or consumption of alcohol); United
States v. Green, 293 F.3d 855 (5th Cir. 2002) (upholding a "Force Protection Vehicle
Checkpoint" operated by military police to inspect vehicles and make sure they had
valid license, registration, and proof of insurance, finding the purpose of this checkpoint
was not the "general interest in crime control," but the more narrow purpose "to protect
a military post, distinct from a general law enforcement mission"); United States v. Davis, 143 F. Supp. 2d 1302 (M.D. Ala. 2001) (upholding roadblock set up by an intergovernmental drug enforcement task force that included law enforcement officials from
the federal Drug Enforcement Administration ("DEA"), the United States Marshal's
Service, the Alabama Bureau of Investigation, the Lee County Sheriffs Department,
and the Opelika City Police Department as part of a comprehensive operations plan to
arrest six of eight individuals named in two federal indictments issued the previous
week); Wrigley v. State, 546 S.E.2d 794 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001) (upholding roadblock set up
by the Motorcycle Squad of the City of Atlanta Police Department as a part of "Operation Street Sweep," a "department-wide operation aimed at cleaning the streets of
crime," because the primary purpose was checking for driver's licenses and insurance
cards and the presence of the DUI countermeasures team suggested a secondary purpose of detecting drunk drivers); Burns v. Commonwealth, 541 S.E.2d 872 (Va. 2001)
(upholding a roadblock with a primary purpose not simply to investigate ordinary criminal wrongdoing but specifically designed to investigate a particular murder that had
recently occurred in the area where the roadblock was placed). But see State v. Abell, 70
P.3d 98 (Utah 2003) (finding "constitutionally infirm" a checkpoint ostensibly established as a drivers' license check, but which included a half-dozen other checks unrelated to driver license violations, including alcohol and/or controlled substance
violations).
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drug traffickers. Had they set up the scheme with the purpose of
checking licenses and registrations, even if they used virtually identical procedures, the checkpoint may have been permissible. 2 92 In addition to suggesting a weak institutional pretext inquiry in future cases,
the Court's use of "special needs" and other suspicionless search
cases-including inventory cases-as authority justifying an examination of the government's purpose for a scheme 293 further blurs the
line the Court appeared to be attempting to draw between these cases
and traffic checkpoint cases. 294 The Court treats different "classifications" or categories differently for some purposes, but feels free to rely
on cases across the spectrum of suspicionless search classifications
when it suits its purpose.
The Court did little to clarify the situation when it next addressed, and struck down, a suspicionless search scheme in Ferguson
v. City of Charleston.29 5 Ferguson involved a challenge to a policy developed by the staff of a public hospital in Charleston, South Carolina.
Concerned about an apparent increase in the use of cocaine by patients receiving prenatal care, the hospital began ordering drug
screens on the routine urine samples taken in the course of providing
prenatal care for maternity patients who were suspected of using cocaine. Patients who tested positive were referred to the county substance abuse commission for counseling and treatment. When the
incidence of cocaine use did not appear to change, the staff approached
the Charleston Solicitor to offer the hospital's cooperation in prosecuting mothers whose children tested positive for drugs at birth. The re292. See Thomas K. Clancy, The Fourth Amendment's Concept of Reasonableness,
2004 UTAH L. REV. 977, 1025 (2004) (nothing in the Court's opinion in Edmond prevents
Indianapolis from simply relabeling the checkpoint and conducting the same screening
for drugs). Although the case did not involve a suggestion of an improper purpose to
detect evidence of criminal offenses, in Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305 (1997), the
Court revealed a similar approach to ferreting out an improper purpose. While it struck
down a drug testing scheme for candidates for elected office because the government
need was "symbolic, not 'special,'" the Court noted that "Georgia's singular drug test for
candidates is not part of a medical examination designed to provide certification of a
candidate's health, and we express no opinion on such examinations," Id. at 323, suggesting that the Georgia officials' only mistake may have been being too blatant about
their desire to prevent drug users from being elected to office as opposed to having an
interest in the health of those elected to office, an interest that included a concern about
drug use.
293. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 ("While reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment is predominately an objective inquiry, our special needs and administrative search
cases demonstrate that purpose is often relevant when suspicionless intrusions pursuant to a general scheme are at issue.").
294. Justice Rehnquist expressed grave concern over the blurring of the line between traffic checkpoint cases and special needs cases. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 53-56
(Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).
295. 532 U.S. 67 (2001).
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sult of a series of meetings and a task force on this issue was the
296
development of "Policy M-7."
The policy set forth criteria to determine which patients should be
tested for cocaine through a urine drug screen and provided for education and referral to a substance abuse clinic for patients who tested
positive. It also added the threat of law enforcement intervention in
order to enhance the effectiveness of the program. Patients who
tested positive during pregnancy were to be arrested only if the patient tested positive a second time or if she missed an appointment
with a substance abuse counselor. 297 Patients who tested positive for
drug use after labor were to be arrested immediately. 2 9 s Ten women
who received obstetrical care at the hospital and were arrested after
testing positive for cocaine challenged the policy. They claimed that
the warrantless and nonconsensual drug tests were conducted for
criminal investigatory purposes and were unconstitutional
2 99
searches.
Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, began his opinion, as did
Justice O'Connor in Edmond, by focusing on the government purpose
motivating the scheme. 300 But Justice Stevens expressed concern
with a search conducted for "law enforcement purposes," the precise
purpose Justice O'Connor had insisted in Edmond was not the relevant purpose. In the very first sentence, he described the Court's task
as deciding "whether a state hospital's performance of a diagnostic
test to obtain evidence of a patient's criminal conduct for law enforcement purposes is an unreasonable search .. ,,301 Throughout his
opinion, Justice Stevens frequently described the purpose that concerned the Court as a "law enforcement purpose," occasionally using
"ordinary crime control" purpose interchangeably. Terminological inexactitude was back. If Justice O'Connor believed her distinction between "law enforcement purposes" and "ordinary crime detection" was
clear-and important-Justice Stevens did not seem to appreciate the
distinction. 30 2 After describing the program in question, Justice Stevens began his analysis by distinguishing the case from the "four pre296. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 70-72 (2001).
297. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 71-73.
298. Apparently, at the start of the program, contrary to the policy, patients who
tested positive during pregnancy were immediately arrested. Later, even patients who
tested positive during labor were given the opportunity to avoid arrest by consenting to
substance abuse treatment. Id. at 72, 72 n.5.
299. Four were arrested during the initial implementation of the policy without the
opportunity to seek treatment; the others either failed to comply with terms of the treatment program or tested positive a second time. Id. at 73.
300. Id. at 69-70.
301. Id. (emphasis added).
302. Justice O'Connor joined Justice Stevens' opinion in Ferguson. Id. at 69.
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vious cases in which we have considered whether comparable drug
tests 'fit within the closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches."' 30 3 He explained the present case
was different, in part, because "the hospital seeks to justify its authority to conduct drug tests and to turn the results over to law enforcement agents without the knowledge or consent of the patients.... ,304
In Justice Stevens' view, that meant "the invasion of privacy in this
30 5
case is far more substantial than in those cases."
But the "critical difference" between the present case and the previous cases, according to Justice Stevens, "lies in the nature of the
'special need' asserted as justification for the warrantless
searches." 30 6 In the previous cases, the justification for the warrantless, suspicionless search was a government interest "divorced from
the State's general interest in law enforcement." 30 7 In a footnote, Justice Stevens explained that the "'special needs' doctrine" was an exception to the general rule that a search must be based on individual
suspicion of wrongdoing, and had "been used to uphold certain suspicionless searches performed for reasons unrelated to law enforcement.30 8 Again Justice Stevens was relying on a "law enforcement"
purpose as a dividing line, something Justice O'Connor in Edmond
denied the Court was doing or had done in previous cases. In Edmond, Justice O'Connor explained the improper purpose was not a
"law enforcement" purpose, but an "ordinary crime control" purpose.
Arguably, the testing in Ferguson could be characterized as being for
ordinary crime control purposes, but even so, Justice Stevens did not
articulate such a purpose or rely on it as Justice O'Connor had done in
Edmond. Either the distinction was lost on Justice Stevens or he believed different tests applied to special needs and to traffic checkpoint
cases. Even if different tests applied to the different types of cases,
that would not explain Justice Stevens using the terms interchangeably. Later in the opinion he described the purpose of the scheme to be
"ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control,"30 9 using Justice O'Connor's standard from Edmond and citing
303. Id. at 77. He later referred to "the closely guarded category of'special needs.'"
Id. at 84.
304. Id. at 77.
305. Id. at 78. Apparently this was so because in the previous cases "there was no
misunderstanding about the purpose of the test or the potential use of the tests, and
there were protections against the dissemination of the results to third parties." Id.
Justice Scalia, in his dissent, made the point that the idea that dissemination to third
parties constituted a greater intrusion was contrary to the Court's precedent. Ferguson,
532 U.S. at 95 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
306. Id. at 79.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 79 n.15.
309. Id. at 81.
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that case. But he went on to state that in the present case, "the central and indispensable feature of the policy from its inception was the
use of law enforcement to coerce the patients into substance abuse
treatment."3 10 In response to the state's argument that "in essence . . .their ultimate purpose-namely, protecting the health of
both mother and child-is a beneficent one," the Court rejected the
purpose articulated by the state and, citing Indianapolisv. Edmond,
instead found that the purpose served by the searches "is ultimately
indistinguishable from the general interest in crime control."3 1 1 In
the Court's view, the record demonstrated a focus on "the arrest and
prosecution of drug-abusing mothers." 3 12 The policy incorporated the
police department's operational guidelines and devoted attention to
chain of custody, the range of possible criminal charges, and the logistics of police notification and arrest, while nowhere discussing different courses of medical treatment other than treatment of the mother's
inaddiction. Moreover, the prosecutors and police were extensively3 13
volved throughout the application and development of the policy.
While conceding that the "ultimate goal" of the program may have
been to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment,
the Court again refused to evaluate suspicionless search and seizure
schemes on their ultimate purpose. Instead, the immediate objective
or primary purpose was the crucial factor. 3 14 The Court determined
that the "immediate objective" of the searches in the present case was
to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes. Given this "primary purpose," the Court held that "this case simply does not fit
3 15
within the closely guarded category of 'special needs."'
The scheme in Ferguson looks an awfully lot like the scheme in
Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte. In each case the government had a beneficent-or at least non-criminal-ultimate goal, but the immediate objective of the traffic checkpoints was to "generate evidence for law
enforcement purposes." Recognizing this, the Court attempted to distinguish those cases in a footnote. First, the Court stated, "those cases
involved roadblock seizures, rather than 'the intrusive search of the
body or the home.'"316 Second, the Court pointed out that it had "explicitly distinguished the cases dealing with checkpoints from those
dealing with 'special needs.'" 3 17 While the Court's first point focusing
310.
311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at
at
at
at

80.
81.
82.
82.
82-83.
84.
83 n.21.
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on the level of intrusion may have merit, the second point is completely unpersuasive. When the Court "explicitly distinguished" the
traffic checkpoint cases in Sitz, it did so without any justification or
explanation. The Court has never explained why traffic checkpoint
cases should be treated jurisprudentially differently than the "special
needs" cases. The Court certainly relied heavily on the special concerns of immigration enforcement and protecting highway safety
when deciding the cases, much as it would if they were special needs
cases. 3 18 But more damning, when the Court dealt with the precise
issue of government purpose in Edmond-a traffic checkpoint case-it
relied on the special needs and administrative search cases to support
imposing a government purpose test. And although Justice Stevens
felt it necessary to distinguish the traffic checkpoint cases in this part
of his opinion, he earlier had cited Edmonds to justify imposing the
primary purpose test in the special needs cases: "In this case, a review
of the M-7 policy plainly reveals that the purpose actually served by
the searches 'is ultimately indistinguishable from the general interest
in crime control.'" 3 19 If the same primary purpose test is applicable to
both special needs cases and the traffic checkpoint cases, the traffic
checkpoint cases must be relevant as precedent, at least on this precise issue.
But the Court's distinction fails even when analyzed in light of
the other special needs cases. Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring
opinion to make the point that the distinction the majority made between immediate purpose and ultimate goal "lacks foundation in our
special needs cases." 3 20 In his view, "[aill of our special needs cases
have turned upon what the majority terms the policy's ultimate
goal."3 2 1 Thus, in Skinner, the Court identified as the special need the
ultimate goal of regulating the conduct of railroad employees to insure
safety, rather than the collection of evidence of drug and alcohol use
by employees. Similarly, in Von Raab and Veronia, the Court focused
on the seemingly ultimate goals of deterring drug use among certain
U.S. Customs employees and deterring drug use by schoolchildren,
318. This led many lower courts to understand these traffic checkpoint cases were,
in fact, special needs cases. See Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 661 (2d Cir. 2005)
(discussing checkpoint cases as special needs cases), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 384 (2006);
United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813 (9th Cir. 2004), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005);
Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 520 (discussing Sitz as a special needs case).
319. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 81 (citing City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 34
(2000)). See Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 532 (stating the Ferguson majority worked hard to
distinguish Sitz, viewing it as a "checkpoint case" rather than a "special needs" case,
even though the majority in Edmonds had relied upon the special needs cases to strike
down the narcotics checkpoint based on the primary purpose).
320. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 87 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
321. Id. (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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particularly student-athletes. In each case, the immediate goal was
the collection of evidence for disciplinary action, albeit not criminal
3 22
sanctions.
The majority emphasized that the criminal law enforcement purpose for collecting the samples was a crucial factor, insisting "in none
of our previous cases have we upheld the collection of evidence for
criminal law enforcement purposes." 323 And the Court dismissed the
fact that the collection of the samples also served a therapeutic purpose. In the Court's view, the "extensive involvement of law enforcement and the threat of prosecution were... essential to the program's
success," and therefore trumped the therapeutic purpose. 32 4 Having
drawn this line, the Court was compelled to distinguish New York v.
Burger in which it had chastised the lower court for failing to recognize a state could have dual motives for designing a scheme to address
a societal problem. It distinguished the case by pointing to the lower
expectation of privacy enjoyed by operators of the commercial premises in that case, to the "plain administrative purposes" that motivated the scheme, and to the fact that the "discovery of evidence of
other violations would have been merely incidental." 32 5 Because it
also relied on "extensive entanglement of law enforcement" to strike
down the Charleston scheme, the Court was forced to distinguish the
traffic checkpoint cases as well. It did so by pointing to the fact that
"those cases involved roadblock seizures, rather than 'the intrusive
searches of the body or the home'" and by again relying on the fact
that "the Court explicitly distinguished the cases dealing with check3 2
points from those dealing with 'special needs'" in Sitz. 6
Ferguson certainly muddies the waters of the Court's suspicionless search jurisprudence. 3 27 It does so first by returning to "terminological inexactitude," describing the purpose it finds improper
both as "for law enforcement purposes" and later as "the general inter322. The routine inclusion of law enforcement and the use of arrests to implement
the present scheme were the important factors for Justice Kennedy. As he read the
cases, "the traditional warrant and probable-cause requirements are waived ... on the
explicit assumption that the evidence obtained in the search is not intended to be used
for law enforcement purposes." Id. at 88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Another essential
distinguishing feature of the special needs cases in Justice Kennedy's view is that the
person searched has given consent, "as defined to take into account that consent was not
voluntary in the full sense of the word." Id. at 90-91 (Kennedy, J., concurring). Justice
Scalia characterized the urine screens in all the previous special needs cases as having
been "obtained involuntarily." Id. at 93, 93 n.1 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
323. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.20.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 83 n.21.
326. Id.
327. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, at § 19.01 at n.13 (recent cases, in particular Edmond and Ferguson, leave the law 'muddier than before").
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est in crime control," two descriptions Justice O'Connor insisted in Edmond were different in important ways. And in order to justify its
new concern with "mixed motive" schemes and extensive law enforcement involvement, the Court was forced to "fracture" its suspicionless
search jurisprudence by distinguishing traffic checkpoint cases, a probation search case, and an administrative search case, despite treating all of these cases as relevant authority when it first struck down a
scheme based on government purpose in Edmond. The result is a sus3 28
picionless search and seizure quagmire.
IX.

THE PROBLEM WITH A PURPOSE TEST: A LIMIT WE
SHOULD LIVE WITHOUT

For those who believe the Court has not sufficiently protected citizens' rights against unreasonable search and seizure, particularly in
the area of suspicionless searches and seizures, it is tempting to applaud the Court's recent cases imposing limits on the government's
power to carry out such searches. Unfortunately, the Court's primary
purpose test is unlikely to enhance effectively the protections enjoyed
by citizens in this area.
First, as applied by the Court, it is a very confusing test. The
Court has used a variety of labels to describe the purpose it finds improper. Given the fractured state of the Court's suspicionless search
and seizure jurisprudence, the purpose to which the Court refers takes
on different meanings in different contexts. In the traffic checkpoint
cases, the Court rejected drawing the line between permissible and
impermissible schemes based on whether the checkpoints were primarily motivated by "law enforcement purposes," and insisted on drawing the line at suspicionless search schemes motivated by a primary
purpose of "advancing the general interest in crime control." 32 9 That
328. In its most recent decision addressing suspicionless searches, Board of Education v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822 (2002), the Court upheld a policy requiring all students engaged in competitive extracurricular activities to be tested for drugs. The decision
included no discussion of primary or ultimate purpose or pretext. Because the Court
had previously found the school context to constitute special needs, debate focused on
application of the balancing test-the extent of the invasion of privacy and the nature
and immediacy of the government's concerns motivating the policy. If the Court had
earlier created a quagmire of the suspicionless search exception, there was no evidence
of it in Earls. The case perhaps is an example of how all these cases should be decideda debate about the infringement of privacy and whether the infringement is justified by
governmental interests, rather than a concern with labels. See infra notes 358-62 and
accompanying text.
329. See City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 44 n.1 (2000) ("The... dissent erroneously characterizes our opinion as resting on the application of a 'non-law
enforcement primary purpose test.' Our opinion nowhere describes the purposes of the
Sitz and Martinez-Fuerte checkpoints as being 'not primarily related to criminal law
enforcement.'"(citations omitted)).
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was a distinction that seemed to elude Justice Rehnquist. 3 30 In the
very next case, when dealing with a drug testing scheme that the
Court characterized as a "special needs" case, the Court drew the line
at the point it had previously rejected, describing as permissible those
schemes "designed to serve non-law enforcement ends." 33 1 The absence of a unified or comprehensive suspicionless search and seizure
jurisprudence means the permissible purpose changes within the category-or among the subcategories-often with no explanation, and allows the Court to simply change and distinguish categories at its
convenience. In Ferguson, the Court again referred to "category" in
the singular, but was forced to distinguish Griffin, Burger, Sitz and
Martinez-Fuertein order to justify its holding. 33 2 The concept of "category" suggests more consistent treatment of cases within the
33 3
category.
Not only does the dividing line between a permissible and impermissible purpose fluctuate, the characterization of the "primary" purpose seems to change. The Court in Edmond deemed traffic
checkpoints set up to detect and arrest individuals smuggling immigrants or driving under the influence of alcohol to have the "ultimate
purpose of arresting those suspected of committing crimes" and to
"primarily ... serve purposes closely related to the problems of policing the border or the necessity of ensuring roadway safety."3 34 But
the Court seemed to reverse the ultimate and primary purposes when
assessing a drug testing scheme set up to detect cocaine use in pregnant women. That scheme was deemed to have "the ultimate goal...
to get the women in question into substance abuse treatment [to protect the health of the fetus]," but the "primary purpose ... to use the
threat of arrest and prosecution to force women into treatment....
Determining the relevant primary purpose is crucial because the
Court claims it is willing to police for institutional pretext. In most
330. It likewise eluded some lower courts. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d
813, 825 (9th Cir. 2004) (referring to Edmond and Ferguson and concluding "the Court's
more recent 'special needs' cases have emphasized the absence of any law enforcement
motive underlying the challenged search and seizure"), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924

(2005).
331. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 74 (2001).
332. See Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 533 (labor necessary to distinguish past cases
highlights the difficulty and potential confusion of using a dividing line that turns on
whether the "immediate objective" was gathering of evidence).
333. The importance of the "category" was further diminished in Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006), where the Court upheld a suspicionless search scheme
utilizing its "ordinary Fourth Amendment approach."
334. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 41-42.
335. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 82-83. The Court also described the "immediate objective" of the searches to be "to generate evidence for law enforcement purposes," Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83, which is the precise objective it described as the "ultimate purpose"
in Edmond. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
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suspicionless search and seizure schemes, mixed motives will be present. The Court asserts that it is imposing the primary purpose test
"to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American
life," 3 3 6 but the Court itself recognizes that in order to prevent that
from occurring, it must be willing to police for pretext in mixed motive
cases. 33 7 If government schemes generally are upheld in mixed motive cases, the Court's institutional pretext inquiry will provide little
protection. But the Court's track record dealing with pretext-and
even its recent opinions-suggests such careful scrutiny is unlikely.
In Edmond, the Court expressed optimism about overcoming "the
challenges inherent in a purpose inquiry"3 38 that was in stark contrast to its reaction to the suggestion for a similar type of "institutional pretext" inquiry in Whren v. U.S. 3 3 9 As an alternative to the
subjective intent inquiry the defendants in Whren sought (and which
the Court rejected), the defendants suggested what they asserted was
an objective inquiry: whether the officer's conduct deviated materially
from usual police practices, so that a reasonable officer in the same
circumstances would not have made the stop for the reasons given. In
response, the Court expressed reluctance to attempt to divine a "collective consciousness": "Indeed, it seems to us somewhat easier to figure out the intent of an individual officer than to plumb the collective
consciousness of law enforcement in order to determine whether a
'reasonable officer' would have been moved to act upon the traffic violation." 3 40 One wonders how willing the Court will be "to plumb the
collective consciousness" of the officials who devised a suspicionless
search and seizure scheme to discover "institutional pretext" and
strike down the scheme.
To truly ferret out institutional pretext requires an inquiry similar to that rejected in Whren. When citizens challenge a scheme on
the basis that the "primary" purpose is not the "regulatory," "administrative," or "non-criminal" purpose the government asserts, but a
"criminal" or "law enforcement" purpose the government insists is secondary, the Court will be forced to assess whether the government's
336. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 42.
337. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 84 ("Because law enforcement involvement always serves
some broader social purpose or objective,... virtually any nonconsensual suspicionless
search could be immunized under the special needs doctrine by defining the search
solely in terms of its ultimate, rather than immediate, purpose."); Edmond, 531 U.S. at
42, 46 ("If we were to rest the case at this high level of generality, there would be little
check on the ability of authorities to construct roadblocks for almost any conceivable
law enforcement purpose"; if the checkpoint program can be justified by a lawful secondary purpose, "law enforcement authorities would be able to establish checkpoints for
virtually any purpose so long as they also included a license or sobriety check.").
338. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 46-47.
339. 517 U.S. 806 (1996).
340. Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996).
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claimed concern with the permissible purpose it asserts is believable.
A relevant inquiry would seem to be whether reasonable government
officials would take such action based on such a concern. 3 4 1 If the
Court is unwilling to "plumb the collective consciousness" in this manner to divine the true primary purpose, and instead accepts whatever
purpose the government professes to be its primary one, the protection
against institutional pretext will be lost. 3 4 2 Unfortunately, this is the
level of inquiry suggested by some of the language in the Court's
decisions.
Prior to Whren, one leading commentator argued that pretextual
searches were unlawful and pointed to statements in the Court's opinions similar to those in the Court's suspicionless search and seizure
34 3
cases suggesting a showing of pretext would change the result.
Proponents of that view were sorely disappointed to be told in Whren
that they had misread the cases. 34 4 They had hoped the Court would
341. Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 993, 997 n.9 (D.C. 1991) (holding
checkpoint unconstitutional in part because trial judge found the primary purpose of
roadblock was to deter drug traffic and violence in connection with Operation Clean
Sweep and that traffic issues alone would not have caused the police to set up a

roadblock).
342. Compare United States v. McFayden, 865 F.2d 1306 (D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding searches established in the District of Columbia as part of "Operation Cleansweep"
to control traffic congestion that resulted from street drug sales as having "main purpose" of allowing police to regulate vehicular traffic by checking drivers' licenses and
vehicle registrations despite police acknowledging hope of "halo" effect of deterring
drug trafficking), with Galberth v. United States, 590 A.2d 990, 993, 997 n.9 (D.C.
1991) (holding checkpoint established in District of Columbia as part of"Operation Cleansweep" unconstitutional in part because trial judge found the primary purpose of
roadblock was to deter drug traffic and violence and that traffic issues alone would not
have caused the police to set up a roadblock).
343. Burkoff, 66 U. DET. L. REV. at 364-65; John M. Burkoff, Rejoinder: Truth, Justice and the American Way-or Professor Haddad's "HardChoices", 18 U. MICH. J.L.
REFORM 695, 695 n.1 (1985); John Burkoff, Pretext Searches, 9 SEARCH & SEIZURE L.
REP. 25 (1982); John M. Burkoff, The Pretext Search Doctrine:Now You See It, Now You
Don't, 17 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 523, 544-50 (1984). See Edwin J. Butterfoss, Solving
the Pretext Puzzle: The Importance of Ulterior Motives and Fabricationsin the Supreme
Court'sFourth Amendment Pretext Doctrine, 79 Ky. L.J. 1, 7-11 (1991) (discussing the
position advocated by Professor Burkoff). Acknowledging an argument by the petitioners, the Court in Whren stated:
We are reminded that in Florida v. Wells, 495 U.S. 1, 4 (1990), we stated that
"an inventory search" must not be a ruse for a general rummaging in order to
discover incriminating evidence"; that in Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367,
372 (1987), in approving an inventory search, we apparently thought it significant that there had been "no showing that the police, who were following standardized procedures, acted in bad faith or for the sole purpose of investigation";
and that in New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691, 716-17, n.27 (1987), we observed,
in upholding the constitutionality of a warrantless administrative inspection,
that the search did not appear to be "a 'pretext' for obtaining evidence of...
violation of... penal laws."
Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 (footnotes omitted).
344. Whren, 517 U.S. at 811 ("[O]nly an undiscerning reader would regard these
[prior] cases as endorsing the principle that ulterior motives can invalidate police con-
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police against pretext in mixed motive cases, only to learn that the
Court's early expressions of concern for pretextual searches related
only to cases where the sole motivation was an improper criminal investigatory motive, or where the permissible basis for action was
fabricated. 3 45 Although the Court has nominally imposed a "primary
purpose" test in the suspicionless search and seizure cases, as discussed above, there are indications that the test the Court has in mind
is unlikely to provide significantly more scrutiny or protection than
the sole purpose test eventually adopted in other contexts.
Although the primary purpose test imposed in Edmond and Ferguson nominally suggests greater scrutiny than the sole purpose test
or the treatment of mixed motives in the administrative search and
inventory search cases, in both cases the Court, while asserting an
inquiry into purpose was appropriate, included a caveat in a footnote
that leaves the door open for the Court to engage in very limited scrutiny of whatever purpose the government labels primary. 34 6 If that is
the end result of the primary purpose test, it will be effectively con34 7
verted into a sole purpose test.
Even if the Court surprises by policing suspicionless search
schemes based on government purpose, such an inquiry is fundamentally flawed. It revives the anomaly the Court has insisted for years it
is trying to avoid-providing more protection to those suspected of
criminal behavior than to ordinary, innocent citizens. Time and
again, the Court has made the point that the Fourth Amendment product that is justifiable on the basis of probable cause to believe that a violation of law
has occurred.").
345. See Butterfoss, 79 Ky. L.J. at 13-46.
346. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 47 n.2 ("we need not decide whether a state may
establish a checkpoint program with the primary purpose of checking licenses or driver
sobriety and a secondary purpose of interdicting narcotics."); Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 85
n.24 ("We do not address a case in which doctors independently complied with reporting
requirements. Rather, as we point out above, in this case, medical personnel used the
criteria set in [the policy] to collect evidence for law enforcement purposes, and law
enforcement officers were extensively involved in the initiation, design, and implementation of the program."). Chief Justice Rehnquist noted a similar "end around" might be
accomplished in Chandler. Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 327-28 (1997) (Rehnquist,
C.J., dissenting). See also, Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 520, 526 (discussing Chief Justice
Rehnquist's position in Chandler and describing the Court's response to a possible "end
around" in footnote two in Edmond as "'rather tepid' after its earlier and bolder warnings in the opinion against ruses and pretexts"); Sundby, 74 Miss. L.J. at 534 (discussing the concurring and dissenting opinions in Ferguson that suggest the only part of the
program the city got wrong was the order in which it took the steps of drug testing and
involving the police; Professor Sundby notes that if those opinions are correct, the Ferguson holding is reduced to more form over substance).
347. See Sundby, 94 COLUM. L. REV. at 1786 n.132 (discussing administrative
searches and making the point that despite the benign label of "administrative," there is
great potential for abuse if the government is permitted to piggyback non-administrative objectives on top).
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vides protection for everyone, especially the innocent. Yet drawing
the line between permissible and impermissible suspicionless
searches based on a law enforcement or crime detection purpose has
precisely the effect of leaving law abiding citizens more vulnerable-it
348
establishes as law the anomaly the Court has decried.
It is a "bizarre turn of doctrinal events" 3 49 that the government is
licensed to exercise more power to intrude on citizens' lives when it is
not seeking to ferret out criminal behavior. 3 50 As a law abiding citizen, the government purpose behind a government intrusion matters
very little to me-it is the intrusion itself that concerns and bothers
me. To use the traffic checkpoint as an example, I am irritated and
inconvenienced by the fact that my ability to continue on my way is
interfered with when I have done nothing to give the government reason to suspect me of wrongdoing. It is no comfort to me that the government intrusion is merely for a "regulatory" purpose. In fact, just
the opposite may be true;3 5 1 I am more likely to be bothered by a "noncriminal" intrusion. Catching criminals seems more important to me
than checking licenses and registrations, 35 2 so I am more willing to
understand and appreciate the need for the government to act, 3 5 3 especially since I am not a criminal. If the stop is for a regulatory purpose, I may be affected and inconvenienced to a greater extent. I do
not have drugs in my car, but I may have forgotten my license, registration or insurance card, or they may have lapsed by a few days.
While the consequences are unlikely to be grave, they will inconvenience me by costing me time and money. 35 4 And I am likely to be
even more upset because "I wasn't doing anything wrong" when the
348. See Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 114-115 (the most surprising aspect of
the special needs doctrine is its return to the "remarkable premise" of Franks v. Maryland); Clancy, 2004 UTAH L. REV. at 1025 (distinguishing between criminal and "noncriminal" is illusory and unwise, leading to anomaly identified in Camara).
349. Schulhofer, 1989 Sup. CT. REV. at 88. See also, DRESSLER, supra note 22,
§ 19.01 nn.9-11 ("remarkable irony").
350. Sundby, 94 COLUM. L. REV. at 1787 (stating the message that must be conveyed
is that the Fourth Amendment is not just for the criminally accused); Schulhofer, 1989
Sup. CT. REV. at 163 (Fourth Amendment intended to safeguard the "dignity and security of the law-abiding public").
351. Sundby, 72 MINN. L. REV. at 434 ("[T]he fourth amendment's threshold concern
is with the intrusion itself and not the intrusion's scope or the government's motivation."); Schulhofer, 1989 SuP. CT. REV. at 115 (reviewing historical evidence suggesting
Framers more concerned with non-law enforcement searches).
352. Sundby, 72 MINN. L. REV. at 434 (stating that when the government intrudes
for a non-criminal purpose or benign purpose, its need to intrude is less urgent than
when it intrudes for a criminal investigatory purpose).
353. This is especially so when the criminal investigation is of a particularly urgent
nature, such as the examples set forth by Justice O'Connor in Edmond. Edmond, 531
U.S. at 47-48.
354. The inconvenience may become fairly substantial. The officer may be unwilling
to let me drive the car if I cannot produce the required documents, and may not permit
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government discovered my errors. I am much less likely to complain if
I am caught speeding and the license and registration offenses are discovered collateral to that. I am still inconvenienced and not happy,
but I am less likely to feel I have been treated unfairly or the government has been overbearing. And a license and registration check in
the middle of the day on my usual route to work or shopping or recreation certainly makes it seem that traffic checkpoints have become
more "an everyday part of American life" than a sobriety checkpoint in
the early morning hours in the vicinity of bars or a narcotics checkpoint along routes frequented by drug traffickers. Of course, implementing a rule that suspicionless schemes with a criminal purpose are
unconstitutional does not mean those with a non-criminal purpose are
necessarily constitutional, but focusing on the purpose makes such a
result more likely. Justice Marshall warned of this in Skinner: "[Tihe
majority endorses the applicability of the Fourth Amendment to civil
searches in determining whether a search has taken place, but then
wholly ignores it in the subsequent inquiry into the validity of that
355
search."
If the Court is to provide the protection of the Fourth Amendment
to all citizens, it needs to refocus its search and seizure jurisprudence.
It needs a comprehensive and unified jurisprudence that provides a
framework to analyze suspicionless search and seizure schemes by the
government. The framework must be one that recognizes the signifi356
cant intrusion involved in these schemes whatever their purpose
and fairly balances the government interest and the interests of the
law abiding citizen. The solution may lie in a model of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence suggested by Professor Sundby twenty years ago.
Early in the Court's struggle to determine when to apply the traditional warrant and probable cause approach to analyze government
searches and seizures and when to turn to its newly crafted reasonableness/balancing approach, Professor Sundby proposed distinguishing between "initiatory intrusions" by the government and "responsive
intrusions. '35 7 Recognizing this demarcation in assessing suspicionless search and seizures avoids many of the pitfalls identified in
the Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence.
me to call family or friends to come get the car. The officer may invoke a departmental
policy requiring the car be towed and inventoried.
355. Skinner v. Ry. Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 641 n.5 (1989) (Marshall,
J., dissenting).
356. See DRESSLER, supra note 22, § 19.01 (line between criminal investigation and
search and seizure designed primarily to serve non-law enforcement goals "is thin and,
quite arguably, arbitrary").
357. Sundby, 72 MiNN. L. REV. at 418-21.
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First, it avoids the anomaly the Court has professed a desire to
avoid but instead has made part of the law by bringing all suspicionless search and seizure cases into a single category. The unifying
theme in administrative, regulatory, and drug tests, as well as traffic
checkpoints, is that they are initiatory. The focus is on protecting
others or society generally; the schemes are not conducted in response
to a specific, perceived or reported offense, and are not aimed at catching the culprit who has committed such an offense. 358 The Court already recognizes this distinction. In several cases it has justified
excusing probable cause by explaining that the "traditional probable
cause standard" is particularly "unhelpful" or "unsuited" in situations
where the government is attempting to prevent hazardous conditions
from arising.3 59 Recognizing the different character of government initiatory intrusions versus responsive intrusions allows the Court to
develop a unified framework for analyzing such intrusions. Rather
than treating similar intrusions differently based on the government
purpose motivating the scheme, 3 60 similar intrusions will be assessed
using the same standard. Not only will the anomaly of providing
greater protection to those suspected of a crime be avoided, such a test
will encourage focusing on a careful assessment of whether the
scheme can be justified, rather than having the determination turn on
a label. At present, there is the notion that a scheme with a "noncriminal" purpose is less intrusive and therefore more likely lawful.
Focusing on the initiatory nature of the intrusion allows the Court to
recognize that such searches, contrary to enjoying a presumption of
reasonableness, present a greater risk to the "right to be let alone,"
which the Court should be more concerned with than the right "not to
get caught." 36 1 With the presumption of permissibility removed, the
Court will have to undertake a more careful balancing to determine
whether to uphold the scheme. Hopefully the focus will be on what is
important-the intrusion on privacy-rather than on labels. Although the Court currently often includes the intrusion on privacy in
its assessment of government schemes, it is a secondary consideration.
When the Court is boxed in by its labels, it often distinguishes
searches it has upheld by explaining they involved situations in which
the individuals involved enjoyed a lesser expectation of privacy. The
358. Or, in some cases, about to commit a specific offense. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1
(1968).
359. See Bd. of Educ. v. Earls, 536 U.S. 822, 829 (2002) ("unsuited"); Nat'l Treasury
Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 668 (1989) ("unhelpful").
360. See Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 78 (stating intrusion "far more substantial" due to
purpose to turn results over to law enforcement for prosecution).
361. See Wright, 93 YALE L.J. at 1136 ("[Blecause the Fourth Amendment protects
privacy interests rather than the interest in avoiding punishment, purpose is not
relevant.").
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privacy analysis should be primary rather than secondary. Rather
than government purpose being the disqualifying factor, initiatory
search and seizure schemes should be upheld only in situations where
individuals enjoy substantially reduced expectations of privacy 3 62 and
procedures exist to provide the safeguards normally provided by the
warrant requirement and the requirement of individualized suspicion.
Because the Court has utilized expectation of privacy as a factor,
we have some indication of how elevating this factor to primary status
may affect the cases. Hopefully, the fact that government purpose is
removed from the equation will cause the Court to reassess its position in some of these cases. If the Court is willing to accept that an
initiatory search scheme poses a grave threat to citizens' Fourth
Amendment interests even if for a non-criminal purpose, then the fact
to which the Court so often points-that the samples or evidence obtained will not be turned over to law enforcement-does not initially
tip the balance in the government's favor. Thus, unless the intrusion
on privacy is otherwise truly minor, the scheme should be in jeopardy
of being struck down. The presumption that such searches are extraordinary will return and they will have to be justified more convincingly than simply deciding they are justified by where they fall on
the spectrum of "reasonable" searches, some requiring a warrant and
probable cause, some only probable cause, some reasonable suspicion,
and some no quantum of individualized suspicion. 3 63 The best example of how this new emphasis may change the Court's analysis is in
the traffic checkpoint cases.
After upholding traffic checkpoints "designed to intercept illegal
aliens" and "aimed at removing drunk drivers from the road," the
Court in Edmond struck down a checkpoint with the "primary purpose
of interdicting illegal narcotics." 3 64 Although the Court admitted that
the "challenged [government] conduct may be outwardly similar," it
found the checkpoint impermissible because the primary purpose of
the checkpoint was to pursue general crime control purposes. 36 5 The
Court did not deny the "gravity of the threat" posed by the "severe and
intractable nature of the drug problem," but unlike in the case of the
immigration and sobriety checkpoints, it was unwilling to engage in a
balancing of the interests. 3 66 Because the purpose was primarily gen362. But see MacWade v. Kelly, 460 F.3d 260, 269 (2d Cir. 2006) (rejecting a "threshold" requirement for application of the special needs exception that the subject of the
search possesses a reduced expectation of privacy).
363. See Sundby, 72 MINN. L. REV. at 401-03, 402, n.64 (suggesting a similar presumption should be overcome to excuse the requirement of probable cause and permit a
search on reasonable suspicion).
364. Edmond, 531 U.S. at 32.
365. Id. at 47.
366. Id. at 42.
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eral crime control, the stops required some quantum of individual suspicion. The only reason the Court gave for imposing such different
treatment on "outwardly similar conduct"-other than the fact that it
had never upheld a scheme for such a purpose-was that unless it
drew the line at roadblocks with such a purpose, "the Fourth Amendment would do little to prevent such intrusions from becoming a routine part of American life." 367 But if the Court simply wanted to limit
the number of such intrusions, it could have drawn the line almost
anywhere. And given its apparent willingness to uphold "mixed motive" checkpoints, the line it drew was likely to be ineffective in limit3 68
ing the number of checkpoints to which citizens are subjected.
Thus the Court is able to profess a willingness to protect citizens from
this perceived evil, but in reality will have provided little protection.
Under the proposed model, each of the checkpoints the Court assessed would be treated as initiatory and subjected to the same balancing of the interests. Conceivably the Court could distinguish
among them, 3 69 but given identical intrusions and important government interests in each case, and without the easy out of permitting
those checkpoints established to advance interests other than "the
general interest in crime control," the Court would be forced to address the issue of whether law abiding citizens should be subjected to
traffic checkpoints. Given the Court's concern that these checkpoints
not become a routine part of American life, which is consistent with its
concern in earlier cases that citizens not be subjected to a search or
seizure whenever they engage in "a basic, pervasive, and often necessary mode of transportation to and from one's home, workplace, and
leisure activities," 3 70 the Court very well might rule traffic checkpoints impermissible. Several states have done so,3 7 1 and in his dissenting opinion in Edmond, Justice Thomas believed such a result
may be the proper one, articulating a reasoning that may appeal to a
367. Id.
368. The "non-law enforcement" purpose test the Court imposed on the special
needs cases has not kept drug testing from becoming something of an "everyday occurrence." See Luna, 48 DUKE L.J. at 876-878 nn.466-80 & 485-88 (documenting court decisions upholding drug testing of attorneys, automobile drivers, carpenters, clerks,
computer specialists, custodians, federal executive branch employees, firefighters,
health and safety inspectors, high school students, law enforcement officers, secretaries,
soldiers, teachers, truck drivers/commercial vehicle operators, horse trainers, chemists,
elevator maintainers, and cashiers; also documenting court decisions striking down
drug testing of many of the same occupations).
369. See id. at 864-66 (suggesting possible different treatment under "anti-discrimination" and "individual sovereignty" models of the Fourth Amendment).
370. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979).
371. Sitz v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 506 N.W.2d 209 (Mich. 1993); Ascher v.
Comm'r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994); City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 755
P.2d 775 (Wash. 1988).
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conservative Court. 3 7 2 This approach would also alleviate the pretext
issue. The incentive for government authorities to play games in articulating the primary purpose of the scheme would disappear.
A similar analysis might be applied to all drug testing cases.
Again, whether to enhance railroad safety, combat a drug problem
among teenagers, ensure the security of the government agency
charged with interdicting drugs, or protect the health of an unborn
child, each scheme would be classified as an initiatory scheme and
subjected to the same balancing test. While all seek to further important government interests, it could be that the expectation of privacy
for expectant mothers seeking pre-natal care would be recognized as
greater than children in the school setting or workers in a highly regulated industry or in sensitive government jobs. In fact, while the
Court in Ferguson blamed the law enforcement purpose behind the
scheme in that case, given the importance of the goal and the similarity of the intrusion to those upheld in previous cases, the Court was
forced to distinguish many of its previous cases based on the expecta3 73
tions of privacy involved.
If it seems radical to suggest the Court should abandon its fairly
recently developed special needs doctrine and primary purpose test
when evaluating suspicionless searches and seizures, one answer is
that it may already have done so. In Samson v. California,37 4 when
faced with a government scheme authorizing suspicionless searches of
parolees by parole officers or police officers "at any time," the Court
refused to analyze the case under the special needs doctrine, as it had
the probation search in Griffin v. Wisconsin, "because our holding
under general Fourth Amendment principles renders such an examination unnecessary." 37 5 The Court diminished the importance of its
numerous previous statements that the "category" of constitutionally
permissible suspicionless searches was a "closely guarded" one, and
that such searches were permissible only in "limited circumstances,"
explaining in a footnote that "although this Court has only sanctioned
suspicionless searches in limited circumstances, namely programmatic and special needs searches, we have never held that these are
the only limited circumstances in which searches absent individual3 76
ized suspicion could be 'reasonable' under the Fourth Amendment."
372. "I am not convinced that Sitz and Martinez-Fuertewere correctly decided. Indeed, I rather doubt that the Framers of the Fourth Amendment would have considered
'reasonable' a program of indiscriminate stops of individuals not suspected of wrongdoing." Edmond, 531 U.S. at 56 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
373. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 83 n.21.
374. 126 S. Ct. 2193 (2006).
375. Samson v. California, 126 S. Ct. 2193, 2196, 2199 n.3 (2006).
376. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201 n.4.
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Once again, the Court's statement may be true, but it seems disingenuous. Over several decades the Court had decided cases by first exploring whether the search in question fell within the "closely guarded
category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches," which
it explained included only limited circumstances. It never suggested
there were other circumstances or, more importantly, that those circumstances permitted upholding suspicionless searches under "ordi3 77
nary probable-cause Fourth Amendment analysis."
Freed from the requirements of the special needs exception, including the requirement of a non-law enforcement or non-criminal
purpose, the Court determined whether the search was reasonable "by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to which it is needed
for the promotion of legitimate governmental interests." 3 78 The Court
recognized two important government interests-an interest in close
supervision of parolees to promote successful completion of parole and
reintegration into society and an interest in protecting society from
criminal acts by reoffenders. The second interest, in essence, was an
interest in ordinary crime control focusing on parolees, who the Court
pointed out were more likely to engage in crime than the general population. 3 79 On the other side of the ledger, the Court concluded that
Samson, as a parolee subject to extensive conditions as part of his parole, "did not have an expectation of privacy that society would recog38 0
nize as legitimate."
Samson demonstrates the Court's facility for conveniently changing categories when that tack suits its purposes. With a non-law enforcement purpose obstacle standing in the way of upholding the
search under the special needs exception that seemed to apply, 38 ' the
377. See Edmond, 531 U.S. at 45 (finding the seizure at issue unconstitutional by
emphasizing that the Court had recognized "only limited exceptions to the general rule
that a seizure must be accompanied by some measure of individualized suspicion" and
not suggesting the possibility that the seizure could be sustained under "general Fourth
Amendment principles"). See also Nicholas v. Goord, 430 F.3d 652, 661-63 (2d Cir.
2005) (reading Edmond and Ferguson as limiting suspicionless searches to those justified by "special needs"), cert. denied, 127 S. Ct. 384 (2006).
378. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197 (quoting United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112,
118-19 (2001)).
379. Id. at 2200. See United States v. Kincade, 379 F.3d 813, 825 n.20 (9th Cir.
2004), ("At various points, Griffin explained that the focus of conditional release is controlling criminal recidivism-that is, the ordinary commission of ordinary crimes by ordinary criminals."), cert. denied, 544 U.S. 924 (2005).
380. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199.
381. In a similar case involving a probation search supported by reasonable suspicion that foreshowed the Samson analysis and result, the Court explained, "Because our
holding rests on ordinary Fourth Amendment analysis that considers all the circumstances of a search, there is no basis for examining official purpose." United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 (2001).
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Court simply switched categories to uphold the search. 38 2 The Court
offered no explanation as to why the search in question did not have to
qualify within the limited circumstances the Court had previously delineated, or why a "general Fourth Amendment approach" was appropriate. 38 3 This easy creation of a new category, if it can be called a
category, 38 4 again demonstrates the need for a unified suspicionless
search and seizure jurisprudence that does not depend on labels to
determine the proper analysis for assessing the constitutionality of
the intrusion. In its early cases addressing the constitutionality of
suspicionless searches and seizures, prior to creating any "categories"
or "limited circumstances" of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches or seizures, the Court treated such searches as exceptional and analyzed them by limiting them to situations in which
the citizen enjoyed a lower expectation of privacy, in which the government interest was substantial, and where the practicalities of the situation and the balance of interests precluded insistence upon "some
quantum of individualized suspicion" but other safeguards were in
place "to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation of privacy
is 'not subject to the discretion of the official in the field.'" 38 5 Although the Court's finding in Samson that parolees "d[o] not have an
expectation of privacy that society would recognize as legitimate" may
have doomed any claim that the search was unreasonable, the Court
also seemed too easily to permit the government interests to overcome
the need for "some quantum of individualized suspicion." 38 6 While the
early decisions required that the balance of interest be such that it
precluded insistence upon individualized suspicion, the Court in Samson merely found the California system that forgave such a require382. See Kathryn R. Urbonya, Rhetorically ReasonablePolice Practices:Viewing the
Supreme Court's Multiple Discourse Paths, 40 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1387, 1423-26 (2003)
(discussing the Court's facile use of different categories in a similar probation case,
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112 (2001)).
383. A similar approach in a similar probation case, United States v. Knights, 534
U.S. 112 (2001), has led lower courts to struggle over which analysis to apply. This is
particularly evident in the DNA sample cases where it has led to a split among the
courts. See Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 658-68 (applying the special needs analysis and documenting the split among the Circuits: the Second, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits have
applied the special needs test; the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits
have applied a general balancing test).
384. On the one hand, it could be said the Court did not create a new category, but
simply ignored the "category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches" including the "limited circumstances" it had previously delineated; on the other hand, by
default, the Court created a new "category" of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches: those analyzed using a "general Fourth Amendment approach."
385. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654-55 (1979) (citing Camara v. Mun. Court
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 532 (1967)).
386. See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2199, 2201 n.4; see also Nicholas, 430 F.3d at 659
(describing the special needs analysis as "more stringent" than the general balancing
test).
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ment was "drawn to meet [the state's] needs and is reasonable .... ,,387
The Court also seemed to undervalue the need for "other safeguards"
to limit the discretion of the officer in the field, and was satisfied that
California's prohibition on "arbitrary, capricious or harassing"
38 8
searches was a sufficient limit.
The real danger of Samson is not the particular outcome of the
case, but the ease with which the Court ignored all its suspicionless
search and seizure precedent by treating the case as a routine application of "our general Fourth Amendment approach."38 9 A unified
search and seizure jurisprudence might not have changed the result,
but it would have at least required the Court to examine how this case
fit in the "closely guarded category of constitutionally permissible suspicionless searches." 390 Instead, the existing "categories" became irrelevant and the Court had no reason to reconcile prior cases because
391
it was utilizing "general Fourth Amendment principles."
X.

CONCLUSION

The Oxford American Dictionary defines quagmire as "a soft,
boggy or marshy area that gives way underfoot"3 92 -an apt description of the Court's suspicionless search and seizure jurisprudence. Although the Court continues to refer to a "closely guarded category of
permissible suspicionless searches and seizures," 39 3 it has failed to develop a unified jurisprudence to guard the category. Its fractured jurisprudence means litigants are never on firm ground. The second
definition offered by the Oxford American Dictionary is "hazardous
situation," 39 4 which is what the Court has created. The Court pur387. Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2201. The Court dismissed the fact that a majority of
states and the federal government require individual suspicion for such searches as being of"little relevance." While such a fact may be of limited relevance to a standardless
"reasonableness" determination, it arguably is quite relevant to a determination that
the practicalities of the situation and the balance of interests "precluded" a requirement
of individual suspicion, although California possibly could demonstrate significantly different or more compelling interests in California than in other states or at the federal
level to justify such a conclusion in California.
388. Interestingly, the Court cited California statute CAL. PENAL CODE ANN.
§3067(d) as stating, "It is not the intent of the Legislature to authorize law enforcement
officers to conduct searches for the sole purpose of harassment." Samson, 126 S. Ct. at
2202 (emphasis added). A sole purpose test offers little protection against harassing
searches. The only protection the Court suggested was that a search would be improper
if the officer conducting the search did not have knowledge that the person searched
was a parolee. Id. at 2202 n.5.
389. See id. at 2197, 2199 n.3.
390. Ferguson, 532 U.S. at 77; see also Chandler,520 U.S. at 309.
391. See Samson, 126 S. Ct. at 2197, 2199 n.3.
392.
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ports to take seriously Justice Brandeis' admonition that "[Ilt is ...
immaterial that the intrusion was in aid of law enforcement. Experience should teach us to be most on our guard to protect liberty when
the Government's purposes are beneficent." 3 95 It is hard to justify
drawing the line between permissible and impermissible search and
seizure schemes based on the government having a "law enforcement"
or "crime detection" purpose. By striking down suspicionless search
and seizure schemes in a few cases, the Court provided momentarily
relief from government intrusion on citizens undertaking "basic, pervasive and often necessary" daily activities. 39 6 In relying on a government purpose test to justify its actions, however, the Court has opened
the door to greater intrusions on the most cherished right of citizensthe right to be let alone. If the Court's "institutional pretext" doctrine
is as impotent as predicted here in policing for improper government
motives, citizens who have given the government no reason to suspect
them of criminal behavior will have lost significant protection.
The only solution is for the Court to rethink its suspicionless
search and seizure jurisprudence, and to construct a unified jurisprudence that provides true scrutiny of government intrusions, no matter
what the purpose. It can do that by recognizing the importance of
carefully policing "initiatory" intrusions by the government, and subjecting all such intrusions to careful scrutiny (and skepticism), regardless of the criminal or non-criminal government purpose. Although
citizens' rights will still depend on the Court being willing to engage in
such scrutiny, at least the decision will be at the forefront, not buried
beneath ever-changing labels. Hopefully, the Court will finally heed
Justice Marshall's call for the Court not simply to extend the Fourth
Amendment to "non-criminal" schemes on the part of the government,
but actually to provide Fourth Amendment protection to citizens
39 7
whose privacy is infringed by such schemes.

395. See Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305, 322 (1997) (quoting with approval this
language from Justice Brandeis' dissenting opinion in Olmstead v. United States, 277
U.S. 438, 479 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)).
396. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 662 (1979) (describing automobile
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